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ABSTRACT 
More than a decade after the attacks on 9/11, United States leadership continues to place 
a high priority on pursuing terrorists and denying them safe havens from which they can 
recruit, train, and plan operations. In a time of decreasing budgets and growing sentiment 
avidly against involvement in prolonged wars, the U.S. must adapt strategies to meet the 
future threats posed by terrorist safe havens. 
This thesis offers strategies for countering safe havens. It begins by arguing that 
safe havens are not just geographic areas, but that they also include a demographic 
component that allows terrorists a population among which to hide. The thesis then 
presents four strategies aimed at denying geographic and demographic safe havens: 
leadership targeting within safe havens, tactical containment, pseudo operations, and 
surrogate security forces. The thesis draws from four historical case studies to examine 
these strategies, including the Peruvian government’s efforts to combat the Shining Path, 
French containment of the Casbah in Algeria’s war of independence, Rhodesia’s Selous 
Scouts’ experience with pseudo operations, and U.S. co-option of the Sons of Iraq in 
Anbar Province. 
The thesis finds that no single strategy is sufficient for dealing with geographic 
and demographic safe havens. Rather, a combination of strategies, properly sequenced, 
can reduce terrorist safe havens. Furthermore, none of these strategies works without 
counterinsurgency forces positively engaging the population, setting the necessary 
conditions for separating insurgents from their demographic and geographic supports. 
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I. TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS 
Though not a new tactic, the concept of terror groups establishing safe haven or 
sanctuary in a particular location has been in the spotlight this past decade in multiple 
global conflicts.  According to the President of the United States in the 2010 U.S. 
National Security Strategy (NSS), the U.S. will “Deny Safe Havens and Strengthen At-
Risk States: Wherever al-Qa’ida or its terrorist affiliates attempt to establish a safe 
haven—as they have in Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb, and the Sahel—we will meet 
them with growing pressure.”1  This emphasis on the denial of terrorist safe havens was 
initially put forth as a recommendation from the 9/11 Commission Report stating: 
The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential 
terrorist sanctuaries.  For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep 
possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national 
power.  We should reach out, listen to, and work with other countries that 
can help.2 
Why have these safe havens flourished since 9/11?  Does the United States actually have 
a strategy to counter terrorist safe havens? More than a decade after the attacks on 9/11, 
our country’s leadership continues to place a high priority on pursuing terrorist networks 
and denying locations that provide them sanctuary, but a definitive strategy specifically 
targeting safe havens is still wanting.  
A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to identify possible strategies that can be employed to 
combat terrorist safe havens. The United States has withdrawn from Iraq and is in the 
process of withdrawing from Afghanistan; U.S. strategy therefore is transitioning from 
large conventional force invasions to achieve policy objectives to a light footprint and 
indirect approach to conflicts.  Given the frequently utilized, but often ambiguous, 
terminology of safe havens, the study will first define and determine what a safe haven is 
                                                 
1 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 21. 
2 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 
2004, 377, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. 
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in order to establish a common ground and understanding of the terminology.  
Furthermore, current literature typically focuses on terrorist safe havens as merely a 
geographic and governance problem. This study, however, will emphasize a missing 
dimension of studies on safe havens—demographic factors, such as tribal identity, 
ethnicity, race, and religion. It is our contention that understanding how demographic 
factors create terrorist safe havens is critical for developing an effective counter strategy.  
Analyzing the puzzle that safe havens present will assist leaders in strategizing 
and resourcing appropriate forces to counter them.  As history has shown there is no 
silver bullet to denying and disrupting terrorist safe havens; however, history provides a 
perspective that can be used to navigate this complex problem.  The arduous task is 
learning from history and adapting strategies to meet the challenges faced by terrorist 
safe havens.  Countering this threat will be an integral component of U.S. national 
security as well as the safety of our international partners. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the conditions that create safe havens for terrorists? What are the current 
options for countering safe havens? What strategy should U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(USSOF) use against terrorist safe havens in particular? 
To address these questions, this thesis will investigate four strategies for 
countering safe havens: 
1. Decapitation/Leadership Targeting 
Decapitation strategy focuses on targeting terrorist leadership. Safe havens 
provide ideal climates in which to recruit, train and organize terrorist groups, but they 
also prevent a vulnerability, namely that leaders often collect in safe havens and, if 
identified, can become ready targets.  Lethal targeting of operational leaders and support 
leaders can have devastating effects on centralized organizations. 
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2. Containment 
Containment seeks to capitalize on geographic safe havens by physically 
quarantining specific areas in which terrorists reside and isolating terror groups from 
resources to include personnel, weapons, finances, and equipment.  This strategy has the 
goal of quarantining and then dismantling terrorist groups.  This strategy is typically 
geographically dependent. 
3. Surrogate Security Forces 
This strategy aims to incentivize key stakeholders in demographic and geographic 
safe havens while also threatening those that are not supportive of the policy objective.  
This strategy has been employed at the micro-level to secure population centers and at the 
state level to maintain peace.  Effectively engaging the human terrain is paramount in the 
success of this strategy. 
4. Pseudo Operations 
Pseudo operations have been employed to sow distrust within networks and to 
provide intelligence in demographic safe havens in order to assist in both lethal and non-
lethal targeting.  This strategy focuses on destroying a network from within and 
destroying the group’s operational capacity. 
C. ARGUMENT 
This thesis argues that the four strategies presented above—leadership targeting, 
containment, surrogate forces and pseudo operations—provide viable potential options 
for USSOF to counter the complex problem of safe havens.  Overall, the case studies will 
demonstrate that each strategy has had tactical success in the short term, but will most 
likely lack long-term sustainment.  Therefore, based on the analysis presented, this thesis 
will argue that the best strategy should be a combination and sequencing of these four 
approaches, with each approach mutually supporting the others. 
Overall, our analysis proposes that in each case, the strengths of an insurgency 
and the foundation for a successful safe haven reside in popular support.  Likewise, the 
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cases will demonstrate that the importance of winning the population’s support is a 
critical variable for long-term success in countering terrorist safe havens.  To have 
enduring success countering terrorist safe havens, the host nation needs to address 
underlying causes or grievances that instigated the insurgent movement and led the 
population to provide sanctuary. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This study will analyze strategies to counter terrorist safe havens based on a 
comparison of historical case studies. Specifically, it will process trace four case studies, 
each corresponding to one of the counter-strategies analyzed in this thesis. For 
decapitation, the thesis will investigate the conditions that led up to the capture of 
Abimael Guzman, the leader of the Shining Path in Peru. The containment strategy will 
be elucidated by an analysis of French counterinsurgency operations in Algeria, 
specifically the battle of Algiers.  The strategy exploring the use of pseudo operations 
focuses on destroying a network from within—and thus its operational capacity—through 
the lens of the Selous Scouts in Rhodesia.  The final case study will examine the Sons of 
Iraq and the strategy of incentivizing the local populace to create an environment that is 
unfavorable to terrorist organizations and that will limit the need for occupying forces to 
maintain a presence and security within the selected area.   
The thesis will then offer a comparison of the cases, analyzing potential strengths 
and limits of each approach for U.S. policy. This comparison will help identify critical 
variables that govern the crafting of a strategy to provide a valuable analysis for future 
operations targeting terrorist safe havens.  
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II provides an overview of the literature 
on safe havens, noting the absence of a critical variable—demography, and the role it 
plays in sheltering terrorists and providing a base from which to operate. The chapter also 
presents four strategies for countering safe havens: decapitation, containment, pseudo 
operations, and surrogate forces.  
Chapter III takes an in-depth look at the Peruvian insurgency known as the 
Shining Path, or Sendero Luminoso.  The case looks at the insurgency’s utilization of the 
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rural population and absence of governmental control to create a sanctuary within the 
country’s hinterlands that allowed for recruiting and the Shining Path’s expansion of 
control.  Once established, the organization attempted to transition its operations from the 
rural to the populated urban areas. However, heavy handedness against the population 
destroyed the Shining Path’s safe haven, allowing the government to successfully target 
the insurgency’s leadership and eventually capture Guzman.  
Chapter IV examines the benefits and drawbacks of a tactical containment 
strategy.  The study looks at the French fight to maintain their colonial security within the 
Northern African country of Algeria.  Specifically, the case focuses on the conflict 
between French forces and the group known as the National Liberation Front (FLN), and 
specifically on the French military’s quarantine of the demographic area of the Casbah 
located in Algiers, the nation’s capital.  Though initially spread throughout the country, 
the conflict peaked when the FLN attempted to unify and condense their support within 
specific Arab neighborhoods in Algiers, including the Casbah. This concentration of 
insurgents allowed French Special Operation Forces to physically surround this 
neighborhood and destroy the insurgents from within. 
The third case, in Chapter V, takes an in-depth look at pseudo operations as a 
means of countering demographic safe havens.  The use of pseudo operations to combat a 
terrorist safe haven was employed during the Rhodesian Civil War in the mid-1960s 
when local insurgents attempted to sever ties with Britain.  The use of pseudo operations 
focused on the ability to sow distrust within the terrorist organization through “flipped” 
indigenous forces, operating as spies and assassins from within insurgent groups. These 
forces then allowed allied forces gain greater intelligence, increase terrorist fratricide and 
confusion, and focus operations against specific targets of opportunity within insurgent 
groups. 
Chapter VI analyzes the effectiveness of co-opting local surrogate forces in order 
to maintain security within a particular region.  This strategy is viewed through the lens 
of the program known as the Sons of Iraq (SOI), which was created in 2007.  In Iraq, the 
program aimed to help incentivize key stakeholders while simultaneously threatening 
those that may be attempting to destabilize the area and create an environment that 
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promotes a safe haven for terrorist activity.  Finally, this thesis provides summary 
findings in its concluding chapter.  Here, we will discuss the costs and benefits of each 
strategy against a particular type of safe haven.  Additionally, we will submit that the 
strategic focus of a country to deny safe havens needs to have a long-term method of 
sustainment.  This means that one strategy alone most likely will not fit all safe havens 
and that properly sequencing these strategies or combining them is the best approach to 
countering safe havens. Ultimately, safe havens cannot be defeated without governments 
addressing the needs and vulnerabilities of their populations. 
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II. SAFE HAVENS AND COUNTERSTRATEGIES 
A. SAFE HAVENS 
Terrorist safe havens have developed in Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, North Africa, the 
Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula. With the bulk of military and foreign aid focusing 
on Afghanistan, these safe havens have thrived and present a credible threat to the U.S. 
homeland, its allies, and interests abroad.  In a time of decreasing budgets and U.S. 
popular sentiment avidly against prolonged wars, as seen by Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
United States must adapt a strategy to meet the future threats of terrorist safe havens.  
Disrupting and denying terrorist safe havens around the world can be achieved, but at 
what cost and through what strategy?  To answer this question we first must define what 
a terrorist safe haven is and understand the variables that currently exist within safe 
havens. 
This chapter begins by reviewing the literature on safe havens. It finds a critical 
gap—the absence of demography as an important variable, alongside physical space.  
This thesis argues, therefore, that safe havens have two distinct variables: geography and 
demography.  Both present distinct challenges to the counter-terrorism efforts and 
strategist must factor in these variables.  Then this chapter presents four strategies for 
countering safe havens: decapitation or leadership targeting; containment; carrots and 
sticks; and pseudo operations. These four strategies will be developed in this chapter and 
then used to investigate the subsequent case studies. 
1. Literature on Safe Havens 
The Department of State (DOS) annually produces a document entitled, “Country 
Reports on Terrorism.”  In 2012, the DOS report identified 12 terrorist safe havens 
worldwide.3 The DOS classifies their identified safe havens to “include ungoverned, 
under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan,  
 
                                                 
3 Department of State [DOS], Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 (Washington, DC: Bureau of 
Counterterrorism, May 2013), 180. 
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raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because 
of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.4  The list of recognized safe 
havens is comprised of: 
AFRICA 
• Somalia:  “In 2012, many areas of Somalia remained a safe haven for 
terrorists, although the “Country Reports on Terrorism” names fewer areas 
than in 2011. Most notably, governmental forces gained control of the port 
city of Kismayo on September 28, which was previously held by the 
terrorist organization Al-Shabaab.”5 
• The Trans-Sahara:  “The primary terrorist threat in this region was al-
Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).”6 
• Mali:  “In 2012, the Tuareg Rebellion, led primarily by the nomadic 
Tuareg people, aided mercenary fighters and arms proliferation 
[traffickers] stemming from the Libyan Revolution, was [sic] followed by 
the arrival of violent extremist and terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida in the 
Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJAO), in northern Mali.  The rebel groups, aided by violent extremists 
in some cases, took advantage of the political chaos in Bamako following 
the March 2012 coup d’état to capture northern towns and cities and 
effectively gain control over northern Mali.”7 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
• The Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral:  “The numerous islands in the Sulawesi 
Sea and the Sulu Archipelago [which include the countries of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines] make it a difficult region for authorities to 
monitor. A range of licit and illicit activities, including worker migration, 
tourism, and trade pose additional challenges to identifying and countering 
the terrorist threat in that region.”8 
• The Southern Philippines:  “The geographical composition of the 
Philippines, spread out over 7,100 islands, has made it difficult for the 




                                                 
4 Ibid., 205. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 205–206. 
8 Ibid. 
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operations over the past 10 years, however, have been successful at 
isolating and constraining the activities of domestic and transnational 
terrorists.”9 
MIDDLE EAST 
• Iraq:  “While the level of counterterrorism pressure exerted by security 
forces varied by region in 2012, the central government took strong action 
to eliminate terrorist safe havens, maintained close counterterrorism 
cooperation with the United States, and made progress in preventing the 
proliferation and trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) both 
within and across its borders.”10 
• Lebanon:  “The Lebanese government does not exercise complete control 
over all regions in the country or its borders with Syria and Israel.  In 
2012, Hizballah militias continued to control access to parts of the 
country, limiting access by Lebanon’s security services, including the 
police and army, which allowed terrorists to operate in these areas with 
relative impunity.”11 
• Libya:  “In 2012, Libyan internal security suffered significant challenges 
and setbacks as it sought to reassert central authority following the fall of 
the Qadhafi regime. Attempts were made to strengthen overall 
counterterrorism and border capabilities to mitigate the various threats; 
however, the Libyan government had serious difficulty in asserting control 
over portions of the country and adequately manning border posts, 
particularly in the east and south, resulting in significant levels of known 
terrorist transit through the country.”12 
• Yemen:  “The Government of Yemen, under President Abdo Rabbo 
Mansour Hadi, remained a strong partner of the United States on 
counterterrorism issues in 2012. The Yemeni government relied on pro-
government tribal militias known as Popular Committees (PCs) to secure 
the area after the military sweep. [Nevertheless, Yemen remains an area of 
primary concern for its safe havens and harboring of Al-Qa’ida (AQ) in 
the Arabian Peninsula.]13 
SOUTH ASIA 
• Afghanistan:  “AQ has some freedom of movement in Kunar and Nuristan 
provinces largely due to a lack of Afghan National Security Forces 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 207. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 208. 
13 Ibid. 
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capacity to control certain border territories in north and east 
Afghanistan.”14 
• Pakistan:  “Portions of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and Balochistan remained a safe haven for 
terrorist groups seeking to conduct domestic, regional, and global attacks.  
AQ, the Haqqani Network, the Afghan Taliban, Lashkar e-Tayyiba, and 
other groups exploited the inability of Pakistan’s security agencies to fully 
control portions of its own territory to find refuge and plan operations.”15 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
• Columbia:  “Colombia’s borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, 
and Brazil include rough terrain and dense forest cover. Coupled with low 
population densities and historically weak governments has allowed for 
potential safe havens for insurgent and terrorist groups, particularly the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National 
Liberation Army (ELN).”16 
• Venezuela:  “The FARC and ELN reportedly continued to use Venezuelan 
territory in 2012 to rest and regroup, engage in narcotics trafficking, extort 
protection money, and kidnap Venezuelans to finance their operations.  
Throughout the year, the Governments of Venezuela and Colombia 
continued a dialogue on security and border issues.”17 
The 2012 DoS report underscores that terrorist safe havens are not confined to 
one country or region, but rather span the globe and are the result of multiple factors, 
including climate, vegetation, governance, and populations. This observation requires 
further refinement on the definition of a safe have and the conditions under which they 
are formed. 
One definition of ‘Safe Havens’ was presented in the spring of 2009 by the 
Interagency Intelligence Community on Terrorism (IICT) and was used in Joseph 
Celeski’s work entitled, Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy Safe Havens.  Celeski’s 
definition, which will be utilized as a reference point throughout the study, defines safe 
havens as: 
 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 209. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 210. 
17 Ibid. 
 11 
an area where terrorists are able to gather in relative security and in 
sufficient numbers to engage in activities that constitute a threat to U.S. 
national security. Such activities include attack preparations, training, 
fundraising, and recruitment often conducted in unsecured or under 
governed geographic areas.18 
Multiple authors utilize the word ‘sanctuary’ interchangeably with “safe haven.”  
As Michael Innes notes in his book, Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe 
Havens: 
Sanctuary is given a broad and ill-defined territorial meaning that 
categorizes terrorist spaces as homogenous, following the “they are either 
with us or against us” viewpoint….  Military actions against chunks of 
territory, even whole countries, which are deemed terrorist sanctuaries will 
have an unavoidable air of imperialism ….  If we are not careful with 
delimiting the geography of terrorist sanctuary, and allow it to be seen as a 
territorial expression rather than one of nodes in a network, whole 
populations can be seen as “complicit” in providing sanctuary to 
terrorists.19 
Given this distinction, this thesis will use the term safe haven because it allows for 
greater disparity, or combination, of the roles that both geography and demography play 
in the influence of areas utilized by identified terrorist organizations. 
When attempting to counter a safe haven, it is beneficial not only to address the 
locations but also “reveal the benefits that terrorists derive from them, including lack of 
governmental interference, inaccessibility to those hunting them, and an environment that 
allows systematic and patient training.”20  Terrorist groups have sought safe havens that 
provide several benefits. One of the most critical assets of a safe haven is the ability of 
groups to plan and train for the execution of terrorist attacks with limited prospects of 
governmental interference.  This freedom of maneuver within a safe haven is imperative 
if a terror group wants to train and grow a cadre of operatives whom they can effectively 
employ either domestically or abroad. 
                                                 
18 Joseph D. Celeski, Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy Safe Haven (Joint Special Operations 
University [JSOU] Report 10-1), (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU, 2010), 20. 
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More importantly, safe havens provide the group with a sense of territory and 
self-governance that lends credibility to the group, which can be very effective in 
recruiting efforts.  The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDRP), produced by 
the Department of Defense (DOD), states that, “[t]errorist groups seek to evade security 
forces by exploiting ungoverned and under governed areas as safe havens from which to 
recruit, indoctrinate, and train fighters, as well as to plan attacks on U.S. and allied 
interests.”21 
Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks by Angel 
Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk and Kim Cragin, defines ungoverned territory: 
both with respect to physical space and to the level of state control, the 
degree to which the state has control of normal government functions.  
Ungoverned territories can be failed or failing states; poorly controlled 
land or maritime borders or airspace; or areas within otherwise viable 
states where the central government’s authority does not extend.  
Ungoverned territories can thus be found along a continuum of state 
control.22 
Author Michael Innes breaks down the understanding of “ungoverned spaces” into two 
distinct categories: Physical Ungoverned Spaces—those hinterlands beyond the effective 
reach of a weak state—and Nonphysical Ungoverned Spaces—domains within a state 
where the government is unable or unwilling to exercise authority.23  A great example of 
these “nonphysical ungoverned spaces” can be found in the work of Anne Clunan and 
Harold Trinkunas entitled, Ungoverned Spaces.24  The authors state that these areas: 
Include political entities such as intergovernmental organizations and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or terrorist networks, and 
economic ones such as major corporations or transnational criminal 
enterprises…. In addition, it [this broader concept of ungoverned spaces] 
highlights the growing importance of virtual realms: politically as 
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channels for terrorists, social movements, and political parties to mobilize, 
but also economically for new forms of corporate and international 
governance.25 
Much of the current literature focuses solely on the notion of terrorists exploiting 
geographical areas for their training and future operations. The Central Intelligence 
Agency, State Department, and White House make reference to terrorist safe havens as a 
geographic location or region, usually situated along a border.26 
The predominant geographic sanctuaries are understood as desert, jungle, or 
mountainous regions, as seen in deserts of northern Mali, the dense jungle in the tri-
border region in South America, and the rugged mountains of the Afghanistan and 
Pakistan border.  As previously mentioned by the QDRP, these “ungoverned” and “under 
governed” areas are the necessary spaces in which terrorist leadership are able to operate 
and train foot soldiers. 
However, the physical geography of a safe haven is only one piece of the puzzle.  
Understanding the terrain and physical infrastructure of a terrorist safe haven supports 
crafting tactical strategies aimed at controlling these spaces, but misses, perhaps, the most 
critical variable, the human terrain of safe havens. The previously mentioned definition of 
“safe havens” is insufficient in that it fails to address demographics and what people 
bring to the creation and perpetuation of safe havens.  For example, a particular group 
people in Africa can be separated and distinguished down to the sub-tribe level.  The 
same could be said of different racial ethnicities centered around highly urbanized areas 
as well, such as gangs, neighborhoods, or religious areas.  The dynamics that are built 
within these cultural communities create an atmosphere that is extremely difficult to 
infiltrate and influence if one is an “outsider.”  Though the geographical terrain is easily 
travelled upon, the socio-ethnic differences occurring in these environments create a 
natural demographic boundary.  These formed boundaries now allow for terrorist 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 18. 
26 White House, National Security Strategy, 21; Denying Safe Havens: Homeland Security’s Efforts to 
Counter Threats from Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, 
Investigations, and Management of the Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of 
Representatives. 112th Cong. 1 (June 3, 2011). 
 14 
organizations freedom of movement within their communal spheres of influence to 
include recruitment, training, planning, funding, and organization. 
This study analyzes examples of geographic and demographic safe havens where 
both territory and populace amalgamate.  The majority of research, literature, and policy 
regarding safe havens predominately focus on geographic areas that are ungoverned and 
provide terrorist groups freedom of action within that territory. Often, safe havens are 
viewed as a product of weak states or failed states where terrorist groups can operate in a 
geographic area free from interference because the government is too ineffective to 
control that space.  However, terrorist groups have developed safe havens within states 
that have robust governance and security forces, like the United Kingdom, through 
demographic safe havens.  In Londonistan, Phillips argues, “Under the noses of 
successive British governments, Britain’s capital had turned into “Londonistan”-a 
mocking play on the names of such state sponsors of terrorism as Afghanistan-and 
become the major European center for the promotion, recruitment and financing of 
Islamic terror and extremism.”27  Islamic terror groups have been able to cultivate their 
ideology by importing dozens of extremists from around the world and then targeting 
local British Muslims with their virulent message.  British born terrorists not only 
orchestrated the July 7, 2005 train bombings in London, but also have been instrumental 
in Al Qaeda attacks spanning the globe.28  Phillips contends: 
The striking feature of all of them [the terrorists] was the freedom with 
which they were able to use London as base camp for their terror 
activities, providing money, means of communication and bogus travel 
and identification documents to trainees who had graduated from the 
terrorist training camps.  And all this without any attempt by the British 
authorities to stop them.29 
Phillips goes on to assert that London has become the European epicenter of 
violent Islamic extremism and a portion of Bristish Muslims view certain neighborhoods 
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in London to be “Muslim areas” where non-Muslims were not welcome.30  The 
demographic safe haven that Al Qaeda and other extremist groups have created in 
London and still enjoy today serves as a stark example of terrorist safe havens developing 
in modern and fully governed states. 
Demography is a critical variable as terrorist networks seek to establish safe 
haven within an area where they can blend in,  become part of society, and exploit the 
human terrain for both tactical and strategic advantages, as evident in London.  The safe 
haven does not necessarily have to be a barren expanse of terrain or a cave high in the 
mountains.  The development of a terrorist safe haven in northern Mali is another recent 
example illustrating the importance of demographics.  Juan Castillo’s recent analysis of 
the conflict in Mali asserts that demographics were the lynchpin of success for both the 
terrorist groups and Malian security forces. According to Castillo, “As the conflict raged 
on it was clear that Mali had transformed itself into a dynamic area of operations in 
which a variety of violent non-state actors not only interacted with each other, but also 
were forced to navigate through a complex human geography.”31 Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb exploited the longstanding grievances of the indigenous Tuaregs, which 
influenced the development of local jihadist groups like the Movement for Oneness and 
Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and Ansar Dine.32  All three terrorist groups were able to 
carve out a space within which they could operate, free from government attacks.  
Understanding the human terrain of safe havens is imperative to crafting strategy 
aimed at fighting this critical asset of terrorist groups. Castillo illustrates the point by 
referencing Mao Tse Tung who equated the civilian population to “water” and the 
insurgent the “fish” that needs the correct conditions to survive.33  Castillo credits a 
melting pot of ethnicities, clans, and tribes for the limited success of the Malian security 
forces to counter the threat and growth of the safe haven.  These groups “developed their 
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own cultural practices, sustenance methodologies and other collective behaviours based 
on their environment and overall group structures and interests.”34 The Malian security 
forces were unable to navigate through the complexity of the human terrain in Mali, 
which favored terrorist networks and provided them safe haven. 
Strategists typically identify key physical terrain that will provide a decisive 
advantage in the conduct of military operations.  However, demographics of the safe 
haven present an even more daunting challenge, where the human terrain is often a 
complex social structure that terrorist attempt to exploit.  Bard E. O’Neill is one of the 
few authors who addresses both the “physical environment” and the “human 
environment” in Insurgency and Terrorism.35  O’Neill argues that evaluating the 
environment should be the first criterion for understanding an insurgency.36  
Furthermore, O’Neill asserts that, beyond just demographics, the impacts of social 
structure to include race, ethnicity, religion and caste systems are criteria that must be 
distinguished.37  O’Neill argues that geography and physical infrastructure can illuminate 
the potential forms of violence that insurgents may use, but demography and social 
groups highlight the underlying causes of the insurgency.38 
Strategists must understand the non-physical space within a safe haven if they are 
going to have success in countering the threat.  Tribal, ethnic, and religious affiliations 
are critical factors in selecting and developing a safe haven for terrorist groups who 
desperately need popular support within the safe haven to be successful.  O’Neill cites 
these social divisions as being particularly important because rival groups compete for 
recruits, and existing grievances between different groups can have an impact on the 
insurgency.39  Secondly, the internal structure of authority is paramount because 
segmented societies have different hierarchical authorities that hold significant power 
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over their segment of the population.40 For example a Sunni jihadist group allied with Al 
Qaeda would have a difficult time cementing a sanctuary within an area that the local 
population is predominately Shia or even within a Sunni community that is not Arab, 
similar to the autonomous Kurdish region of Northern Iraq.  Therefore, terror groups 
seeking safe haven must consider tribal and sub-tribal societal structure when seeking out 
safe havens.  The population must be sympathetic, coerced, or co-opted in order to 
develop a safe haven. 
We will argue that the human domain of a safe haven is just as critical to the 
counter-insurgent as it is to the insurgent if either is to achieve victory.  Some terror 
groups will instill fear to achieve a foothold within the indigenous community, but the 
most successful groups attempt to develop popular support from the population, which if 
properly secured can present the counterinsurgent with an almost insurmountable task.  
Demography presents an obstacle to developing intelligence for the counterinsurgent and, 
without quality intelligence, a strategy has limited prospects for long-term success. 
B. STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING SAFE HAVENS 
Currently, much of the written literature surrounding the strategy of attacking 
enemy safe havens is either too vague, or places the majority of the emphasis on the 
geographical nature of the identified area. Though many documents highlight the 
importance of denying terrorist safe havens and the relative security they provide, the 
strategy is either too broad or too ambiguous to be effective or realistic. 
The failure to synergize strategy to policy is supported by testimony from 
Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, contained in a Government Accountability Office’s 
(GAO) report that examines the basic inefficiency of strategies to counter safe havens.41  
The report indicates a breakdown on the communication among government agencies to 
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accurately report on the strategic initiative found in the National Security Strategy.  
Williams-Bridgers goes on to specifically testify that: 
[t]he U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to 
identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. Congress required the 
President to submit reports outlining U.S. government efforts to deny or 
disrupt terrorist safe havens in two laws—the IRTPA and the National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010.42 
The issue, according to the GAO, is not necessarily the collection of data to adequately 
categorize these areas.  The Department of State produces a document that identifies 
about a dozen key terrorist safe havens each year, the annual Country Report on 
Terrorism.”43  The apparent problem highlighted in Williams-Bridgers testimony is the 
failure to effectively “address the full scope of U.S. activities or assess overall 
effectiveness”44 of the United States’ strategy to deny or disrupt these sanctuaries. This is 
a gap that that this thesis aims to help fill. 
This study provides four distinct strategies that can be used against terrorist safe 
havens. 
1. Decapitation/Leadership Targeting 
A decapitation strategy focuses on targeting terrorist leadership.  Lethal targeting 
of operational leaders and support leaders can have devastating effects on centralized 
organizations.  Safe havens afford terrorist organizations the freedom to recruit, train, and 
operate in relative security.  However, safe havens also present a vulnerability for 
terrorist groups. Safe havens draw in clusters of leaders to manage recruitment, training 
and operations. 
In order to best disrupt or deny the terrorist activities that are operating within 
these sanctuaries, one employable strategy would be to directly target the leadership.  The 
general concept behind this strategy would be twofold: to disrupt the organization from 
the top down and deter subordinate leadership from wanting to assume the vacant role 
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because of the fear of similar removal.  The intent of this approach would be to cause 
confusion and precipitate the inability within this terrorist group to adequately organize 
because of the vacuum created by the targeted removal of leadership. 
This strategy, however, has come under much criticism in recent years.  The 
removal of Usama Bin Laden and other high profile terrorist leadership have continued to 
bring this strategy into the forefront of public opinion through the debate found on most 
mass media outlets.  Disagreements on the use of leadership targeting stem from the 
proper application of international laws and regulations, political disagreements, and even 
moral arguments over this strategy, as evidenced with the use of drone strikes. 
Furthermore, decapitation strategies have come under attack regarding their 
overall effectiveness in destroying terrorist organizations and reducing acts of terrorism. 
For example, in her article, When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership 
Decapitation, Jenna Jordan works to “determine whether decapitation is an effective 
counterterrorism strategy that results in organizational collapse.”45  As Jordan points out, 
“[t]he belief that decapitation is effective is based upon the notion that leadership is 
essential to the functioning of an organization.”46  There appears to be a common 
understanding that the success, failure, or efficiency of an organization is often seen in 
the assessment and insight of the leadership.  Jordan argues that leadership targeting as a 
strategy is effective, but is dependent on an organization’s type of basic demographic 
composition.  The results of the proposed “decapitation” strategy will lend themselves 
only to specific, rare, isolated cases of success.  Jordan’s collection of data leads to her to 
identify key variables that are highly influential when determining if or when this is an 
effective strategy.  Jordan writes: 
[a] group’s age, size, and type are all important predictors of when 
decapitation is likely to be effective. The data indicate that as an 
organization becomes larger and older, decapitation is less likely to result  
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in organizational collapse.  Furthermore, religious groups are highly 
resistant to attacks on their leadership, while ideological organizations are 
much easier to destabilize through decapitation.47 
Jordan makes a strong case for the specific conditions under which decapitation strategies 
work and even goes as far to state that “going after the leaders of older, larger, and 
religious groups is not only ineffective, it is counterproductive.”48 
Though some might argue that leadership targeting is highly ineffective, or that it 
should be used only in rare situations, others indicate that this strategy is a much more 
effective means to deny and disrupt safe haven activities.  Patrick B. Johnston, for 
example, disagrees that decapitation strategies are largely ineffective, arguing: 
[t]his consensus is premature. Researchers have conducted few systematic 
assessments of leadership decapitation’s effectiveness; evidence remains 
scant. But contrary to scholars’ claims that leadership decapitation never 
works, the evidence appears to be more mixed. In numerous cases, 
decapitation was vital in degrading and defeating militant groups. In Peru, 
for example, Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán’s 1992 capture 
crippled the group’s bid for power.49 
Johnston’s critique for those who argue that this is not a viable strategy mentions that 
“the research design and methodologies used in nearly all previous studies make it 
difficult to draw credible conclusions about the impact of leadership decapitation.”50  
Instead, Johnston argues that the collected data 
suggest that leadership decapitation  (1)  increases  the  chances  of  war  
termination;  (2)  increases  the probability of government victory; (3) 
reduces the intensity of militant violence; and (4) reduces the frequency of 
insurgent attacks.51 
Though there are opposing views regarding the effectiveness of leadership 
targeting, there is evidence to suggest that it has been used successfully in previous 
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conflicts.  This study will point out that leadership targeting is a viable strategy when a 
state is attempting to deny or disrupt an enemy safe haven.  Specifically, it will 
investigate the inception, growth, and destruction of the Shining Path in Peru, an 
insurgency located in the western portion of South America. This case offers a useful 
analysis of the implications and successes in utilizing a decapitation strategy. 
2. Containment 
This strategy aims to quarantine and then dismantle terrorist groups.  Though 
often complex in execution, this idea of quarantining the problem can be broken down 
into two simple distinct categories; strategic and tactical. 
The strategic form of containment aims to quarantine and isolate states through 
diplomatic activities (condemnation from the United Nations), sanctions (economic 
embargos), and some military actions (threat of force).  Perhaps one of the greatest 
incidents of strategic containment occurred in the decades following World War II, in 
which the United States faced a new enemy—the Soviet Union and communism—and 
through the threat of nuclear war was forced to fight these threats in new ways.  President 
Harry S Truman introduced America’s first strategy of containment in March 1947 in a 
speech that was later coined “The Truman Doctrine.”52  President Truman pushed for 
support and aid to Turkey and Greece in an attempt to ultimately “contain” the threat 
posed by the spread of communism.  Truman also bolstered war devastated Western 
Europe through the Marshall plan, which sought to jumpstart Europe’s industrial 
economy, thus returning prosperity to the region and creating a capitalist bulwark against 
the promises of communism. 
That same year, George F. Kennan, the infamous “Mr. X,” published an 
anonymous letter in Foreign Affairs describing a strategy of containment for the Soviet 
Union.  Regarding the political struggles between the Soviet Union and the Western 
Countries, Kennan writes, 
[t]his would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable 
confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the 
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Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show 
signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world.53 
Kennan’s strategy of containment was focused against the industrial and potential 
military might of the Soviet Union, not countering the ideology.  Overall, strategies of 
containment throughout the Cold War aimed to engage and contain the Soviet Union (and 
later communism as a whole) through diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, arms 
racing, proxy wars, and negotiations. 
The United States continues to use strategic containment as a strategy for 
confronting adversaries. Though military force can, and should, always be an option, the 
strategic means of containment can take more indirect forms.  These methods can easily 
be identified through the United Sates application against unfriendly adversaries in the 
forms of sanctions, trade embargoes, and increased military and economic aid to allies. 
Tactical containment is dependent on certain geographic conditions. A useful 
analogy of tactical containment is a dam at the end of a river or a barrier to prevent an oil 
spill from leaking further into the ocean; the goal is to stop the movement of a contagion 
through the creation of physical barriers such as walls, barricades, checkpoints, and other 
obstacles that prevent the free flow of objects, including people. 
There are multiple examples of tactical containment throughout history. This 
thesis will investigate the French counterinsurgency in Algeria during the mid1950’s to 
early 1960s.  Algeria’s capital, the port city of Algiers, became the epicenter of the 
struggle for independence. The conflict in Algiers began with petty crime and minor 
disturbances between the French colonists and Algerians.  Clashes between police forces 
and local nationals escalated until French paratroopers were deployed to manage the 
threat.  The French strategy of containment was to literally wall off the Casbah 
neighborhood in Algiers—the urban safe haven of the insurgents—and to destroy the 
organization from within the walled compound. This case study will be examined in 
Chapter IV. 
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3. Co-opting Surrogate Security Forces 
Incentivizing key stakeholders while also threatening those who are not 
supportive of the policy objective is a strategy that the United States has employed in the 
past.  This strategy has been employed at the micro-level to secure population centers and 
at the state level to maintain peace.  Specifically, this strategy has been used in societies 
that have a robust tribal dynamic and weak central governance.  A recent example is U.S. 
forces financing, training, and supplying the Sons of Iraq in Al-Anbar province, Iraq, 
where Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had solidified a safe haven following the U.S. invasion in 
2003.  At the root of the strategy is securing the support of the population; without 
popular support neither the terrorist nor the counter-terrorist can be successful.  The 
strategy seeks to create an inhospitable place for terrorists where the local population and 
indigenous security forces directly and indirectly counter terrorist groups, not the 
occupying forces.  The importance of co-opting locals in tribal societies is critical 
because the tribal authority in these societies carries more influence with the population 
than the central government or occupying forces. 
Austin Long addresses the strategy of co-opting locals and argues that “Tribal-
State Security Relations” can essentially produce three types of relationships that evolve 
from co-opting tribes for security; a fourth that emerges is a variant that illustrates the 
U.S. strategy in Anbar province.54  In his article, The Anbar Awakening, Long goes into 
detail regarding these relationships by stating them in relative priority, primarily that, 
[t]he first is most likely in relatively stronger states and occurs when one 
group seeks to dominate the state’s security apparatus by com-
mingling[sic] tribal networks with the formal state structure. This “state 
tribalism” is common in states that have not fully institutionalized [sic] the 
mechanism for providing internal security.55 
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Long asserts that state tribalism is common in the Middle East and parts of Africa.56  The 
author continues his analysis of the types of relationship that can be commonly found by 
arguing:  
[t]he second pattern is common in weaker states and involves quasi- 
autonomous militias based on tribe (or more broadly on ethnicity). These 
militias are effectively “deputized”[sic] to provide internal security in 
certain regions in exchange for some form of payment from the central 
state. This pattern can be termed “auxiliary tribalism.”57 
According to Long, Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s is the best example of this 
form of tribal security relations.58  He quantifies this statement by adding that, 
[t]he final pattern of relations is the cession of all but the most desultory 
control over a territory to a tribe. Only the weakest or poorest of states 
would normally accept this type of relationship. Tribal leaders become, in 
effect, palatine vassals of the central state, and are often as restive as their 
medieval counterparts. This pattern can be termed ‘baronial tribalism.’59 
Baronial tribalism is prevalent in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of 
Pakistan and areas of Yemen.60  Lastly, Long mentions that, 
[a] final variation on these three patterns occurs when an external power 
becomes involved in the provision of internal security to a state. This 
presents the possibility of a three-way relationship among tribe, state and 
external power that can produce many complications.61 
This hybrid variant was evident during U.S. efforts in South Vietnam co-opting the 
Montagnards and in Iraq where U.S. forces developed a carrots and sticks strategy with 
the Sunni tribes in Al Anbar Province.62 
There are advantages and disadvantages to co-opting local power brokers to deny 
terrorists a safe haven, and the strategy must be carefully employed and constantly 
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nurtured to be successful. First, local leaders, whether they represent tribal authority or 
religious leadership, have an agenda, and their personal preferences may not align with 
the United States or the host nation government’s goals. Therefore, the occupying force 
needs to understand the agenda of the local leaders and support that agenda in order to 
leverage their power.  The human dynamic is the most critical variable in this strategy 
because shifting allegiances as well as rivalries with other power brokers in the area can 
result in arming and supporting the wrong group.  Norman Cigar argues, “even if 
successful in terms of increasing security, fielding local forces may lay the groundwork 
for longer-term consequences with which a local government will have to deal 
eventually.”63  This may include fomenting separatist movements and insurgencies. 
Empowering the tribal authorities in Iraq resulted in significant success at 
destroying AQI’s safe haven, but this success also alienated the central government in 
Baghdad. Cigar asserts that, within circles of government in Baghdad, the “tribalism” the 
U.S. empowered prevented further modernization and governance that the Baghdad 
authorities were trying to achieve.64  The overall policy objective in Iraq was to develop 
a robust and democratically elected government, but yet the U.S. was paying and 
empowering local fighters to enhance security, ultimately undermining the 
democratically elected government.  This strategy may seem to be at odds with the stated 
overall objective in Iraq, but some argue it was a necessity for denying Al Qaeda’s base 
of operations.  Empowering local militias to deny terrorists a safe haven seems to be a 
viable solution tactically, but may have limiting factors strategically. 
Co-opting local security forces must be carefully implemented and the selection 
criteria for the supported local authorities must be stringent and the leadership vetted.  In 
order to determine who to support one must acquire a vast amount of intelligence 
regarding that individual or group that the strategy is aimed prior to moving forward with 
support.  Simply paying and arming local militias may exacerbate the safe haven if the 
supported force is actually playing both sides of the conflict and simply acting as an 
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opportunist.  Furthermore support must continue until the central government of that 
country can support the effort itself, or the strategy runs the risk of losing the fragile 
gains made.  In Iraq, AQI is now combating the strategy with its own version of the 
“carrot-and-stick” method in Al Anbar province.65  AQI operatives have developed their 
own local alliances with SOI members and threatened those that were not amenable to the 
agreement, resulting in some SOI leaders being sympathetic to AQI due to a lack of 
governmental support.66  Following through with a plan for maintaining the tribal 
security forces or transitioning to government security is critical, and without it, terrorists 
will simply flow back into the area unmolested. 
The implementation of the surrogate security forces strategy will be further 
analyzed in a case study of the SOI and their success combating Al Qaeda safe havens in 
western Iraq.  The case of the SOI provides a valuable analysis for understanding the 
benefits as well as the dangers of co-opting locals to deny terrorist safe havens. 
4. Pseudo Operations 
Both geographic and demographic safe havens present challenges for forces 
targeting networks where intelligence is difficult to gather and the utility of striking a 
target may not be possible or even counter-productive to the overall effort. A strategy that 
has been employed effectively in Kenya, Northern Ireland, Malaya, and Rhodesia has 
been the use of “pseudo teams” to infiltrate terrorist safe havens and networks to garner 
actionable intelligence, conduct strikes, and sow distrust amongst terror groups. This 
strategy focuses on destroying a network from within and destroying the group’s 
operational capacity. 
Pseudo operations, “indicates the use of organized teams which are disguised as 
guerrilla groups for the long- or short-term penetration of insurgent controlled areas.”67   
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The tactic of disguising oneself as the enemy is as old as warfare, but effectively applying 
a pseudo strategy requires special skills, specially selected individuals, command and 
control, and patience. 
According to James Spies, “Utilizing informants and sources in the conduct of 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism has been limited to intelligence gathering alone 
without emphasis on large-scale infiltration of terrorist networks.”68  Deep infiltration of 
terror networks and their safe havens cannot be achieved without the use of human 
intelligence (HUMINT); too often the United States has relied on technology to bridge 
the gap where HUMINT is lacking.  Pseudo teams, comprised of “turned” insurgents who 
have been extensively vetted, provide a deep penetration strategy that is required to 
effectively target terrorist groups in safe havens. 
Initial doctrinal use of pseudo teams was developed by General Sir Frank Kitson 
of the British Army while fighting the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya, which spanned 
from 1952–1960.69  Kitson arrived in Kenya in 1953 and found that the sweeps the 
British were conducting were not producing results.70  Kitson devised a plan of “turning” 
captured Mau Mau insurgents and employing them against the insurgency by penetrating 
insurgent networks for intelligence gathering.  Kitson’s pseudo groups devastated the 
Mau Mau and were far more effective than the aerial bombardment and massive 
conventional sweeps that preceded their employment.71 
Kitson used his extensive experience with pseudo operations against the Mau 
Mau as a template for executing operations in Malaya, where the colonial government 
battled a communist insurgency from 1948–1960.72  The communist guerrillas were 
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“almost completely unable to cope with this new approach to fighting them.”73  By 1960, 
Kitson and the British had quelled the guerrilla problem in Malaya and developed and 
proven a new doctrinal approach that would soon be mimicked in the 1965–1980 
Rhodesian Bush War by a special operations unit known as the Selous Scouts.74 
The Selous Scouts of Rhodesia were a Special Forces unit composed of white 
Rhodesian NCOs and officers who led teams of African pseudo operators who were 
“turned” insurgents fighting against guerrillas during the Rhodesian Bush War.  The 
Selous Scouts would penetrate the guerrilla safe havens and garner actionable 
intelligence and relay the information to Rhodesian strike forces, typically composed of 
the Special Air Service (SAS) that had a quick reaction time and employed helicopter 
assaults to destroy guerrilla formations and camps. This concept provided anonymity to 
the pseudo operators and limited their chances of compromise to the guerrillas.  The 
Selous Scouts used the doctrine that Kitson had proved in Kenya and Malaya but evolved 
the concept to include conducting lethal strikes, which changed the way pseudo operators 
had historically been employed. 
The implementation of the pseudo operations strategy will be further analyzed in 
a case study of the Selous Scouts and their success combating two communist 
insurgencies during the Rhodesian Civil War.  The case of the Selous Scouts provides a 
valuable analysis for understanding the conceptual framework and doctrine of pseudo 
operations. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Realizing that the complexity of the problem that terrorist safe havens present, 
this study attempts to provide military strategists assistance in framing the problem set.  
The variables of geography and demography are distinct and each presents a set of 
challenges that the strategist must contend with in order to craft a realistic and feasible 
strategy. Despite being analytically distinct, each strategy that we propose in this study 
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may only be a partial solution for defeating territorial and demographic safe havens in 
practice. In other words, these strategies are not mutually exclusive and potentially a 
combination or sequencing of these strategies may be the solution to a particular safe 
haven.  The following case studies will further elucidate these points. 
The next four chapters will present case studies where each of the strategies to 
counter safe havens will be explored in greater detail. Chapter III will investigate 
leadership targeting against the Shining Path in Peru. It will look at the short term effects 
of the capture of Guzman, but also note the return of the Shining Path in recent years. 
Chapter IV will trace the French tactic of containment in Algiers in the 1950s and 1960s, 
noting the successes and limits of this approach. Chapter V will process trace a more 
recent case, the U.S. use of “carrots and sticks” to coopt the tribal leadership in Anbar 
Iraq, with the aim of fighting AQI. And Chapter VI will analyze the Rhodesian’s use of 
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III. DECAPITATION: A LEADERLESS VICTORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
States’ policy towards terrorism made a strategic shift from a law enforcement effort to 
viewing terrorism as an act of war.  President George W. Bush declared a Global War on 
Terror (GWOT) and promised that attacks against the United States would not go 
unpunished, and terrorist groups would be pursued around the world.  Over a decade has 
passed since the attacks on New York and Washington D.C.; the GWOT continues with 
targeted counter terrorism operations, two wars of occupation in Middle Eastern 
countries, and limited success with de-radicalization efforts. 
One method to fight or deter this growing threat against the United States is the 
implementation of a decapitation strategy that focuses on targeting terrorist leadership, 
either through killing or capturing key individuals.  The general concept behind this 
strategy would be twofold: to disrupt the organization from the top down and deter 
subordinate leadership from wanting to assume the vacant role because of the fear of 
similar removal.  The intent of this approach would be to cause both confusion and the 
inability to adequately organize within a terrorist group because of the vacuum created by 
the targeted removal of leadership. 
In addition to causing a leadership vacuum, effective targeting of terrorist 
leadership increases so called “terrorist fratricide”—terrorists killing suspected 
informants within their ranks. Terrorist fratricide is evident amongst terror groups that 
have had their leadership targeted from Al Qaeda to the Tamil Tigers.75  Exploiting 
Terrorist Fratricide is an important potential force multiplier for U.S. efforts to defeat 
terror groups through leadership targeting.  Furthermore, an effective leadership targeting 
methodology exploits seams in the group’s network and provides immediate and 
measurable feedback in the numbers killed and captured. 
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Decapitation strategies, however, have come under criticism in recent years.  
Disagreements on the use of leadership targeting stem from the debates over international 
laws and the legality of targeting individuals in foreign countries, as well as from 
political disagreements, questions concerning the overall effectiveness of the strategy, 
and even arguments on leadership targeting’s morality, as evidenced by the use of drone 
strikes on suspected terrorists. 
Geographic and demographic safe havens play a potentially important role in 
leadership targeting. Safe havens afford terrorist organizations the freedom to recruit, 
train, and operate in relative security.  However, safe havens may also present a 
vulnerability for terrorist groups as they draw in leaders to manage recruitment, training, 
and operations. 
The strategy of leadership targeting in demographic and geographic safe havens 
will be examined in this chapter through operations used by the Peruvian government to 
target and disable leadership in the Shining Path during an approximate 10 year period 
from 1982–1992.  This study will first look at the background conditions that caused this 
insurgency to flourish.  The study will then examine the importance of structure and the 
influence that a charismatic leader has on an organization’s direction and ideology.  
Finally, the inspection of such critical elements will provide an analysis of how the 
Peruvian government’s use of leadership targeting impacted the country’s insurgency.  
The closer examination of this case will demonstrate the positive gains, risks, and 
negative affects incurred when implementing a decapitation strategy in a geographic and 
demographic safe haven. 
B. THE SHINING PATH: PERU’S INSURGENCY 
Although elements of the organization can be traced back to the mid 1960’s, a 
Maoist insurgency known as the Shining Path, or in Spanish Sendero Luminoso, sprang 
up from the poor, uneducated, indigenous peasants who lived in the ungoverned 
mountains of Peru in the early 1980s.   Although its rank and file was composed of 
peasants, the Shining Path was led by an academic scholar named Abimael Guzman 
Reynoso.  Guzman, a Communist Party member, was able to mobilize students and 
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teachers at the small university where he taught, as well as a guerrilla force of peasants 
living in poverty and neglected by the Peruvian government. 
Sendero Luminoso took root in the department of Ayacucho, Peru; a river valley 
area that has a dispersed population and steep, rugged terrain.76  In The Shining Path, 
Billie Jean Isbell describes why this was a critical place to begin the insurgency, 
Sendero chose Chuschi for its initial military operations precisely because 
of this absence of haciendas, which allowed SL [Sendero Luminoso] to 
experiment with peasant communities that had strong communal 
structures, autonomy over their resources, and whose experiences with 
capitalistic market penetrations were minimal.  By initiating their 
revolution in what they believed to be a region that had escaped many of 
the semifeudal relationships of the hacienda system, Sendero perhaps 
hoped to avoid the mistakes made by the guerrillas inspired by the Cuban 
revolution who failed to gain support of hacienda peons for their short-
lived insurgency in 1965.77 
The peasantry, in other words, provided an ungoverned area that was ripe for influence 
and recruitment. 
The ability for Sendero Luminoso to identify an area that allowed it to begin a 
base of operations was critical to the initial growth of the movement.  Like any 
organization seeking to take a foothold, Sendero Luminoso found shortcomings in Peru’s 
governmental structure and then worked to exploit existing gaps.  Due to terrain, and 
possibly a degraded sense of sympathy for the indigenous population, the government 
kept the rural hinterlands at a distance and free of government intervention.  These 
pockets of indigenous people outside the major urban city centers, like Lima, were easy 
converts to the Shining Path, which capitalized on the government’s regional absence and 
influence.  The division formed amongst the Peruvian population set the conditions for 
Guzman’s ideology to flourish.  Ton de Wit and Vera Gianotten note that a for a poor, 
impoverished demographic like that of Ayacucho, a “deficient infrastructure, permanent 
shortage of drinking water, limited production of energy, and inadequate means of 
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communication perpetuate indefinitely the already limited possibilities.”78  Simon 
Strong, in, Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism, further describes the 
demographic safe haven where the Shining Path took root, 
Three quarters of the Ayacucho department’s inhabitants scraped a living 
by subsistence farming…. State justice lay mostly in the hands of those 
who could afford it.  With the grinding poverty, the absence of schools 
and medical posts, the malnutrition and 45-year life expectancy, and its 
alienation from and contempt for central government, the region was 
fertile breeding ground for revolutionary Marxism.79 
In order to capitalize on this separation between the people and the government, 
the Shining Path needed to demonstrate to the population that it could provide for them, 
particularly by offering services that the current government was not providing.  In the 
case of Sendero Luminoso, they attempted to sever the relationship between Peru’s 
governmental leadership based in Lima and that of the local Ayacucho population 
through several means.  First, they targeted the 1980 democratic elections.80  This 
demonstration, recorded as the first violent act conducted by the insurgency, was an 
attempt to “undermine the transition to democracy and provoke a continuation of military 
rule.”81  Insurgency expert Gordon McCormick points out that the main issue facing the 
Shining Path was the ability “to turn this potential base of support into a reliable source 
of recruits, intelligence, and material aid.”82  Michael L. Smith echoes these observations 
by contending that “Sendero [needed] this power to turn peasant communities irrevocably 
against the state.”83 
Second, the Shining Path created a demographic safe haven by providing an 
important form of security and justice to the peasantry. Isbell writes, 
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[t]he most significant factor leading to initial peasant support was that, at 
the beginning of Shining Path’s insurgency, peasants in Chuschi were in 
favor not only of the popular schools and the moralization campaigns, but 
also of Sendero’s program of eradication of “public enemies.”84 
In other words, Peru’s failure, or inability, to address the Shining Path’s activities in the 
hinterlands led to increased popular support for the insurgency. 
Third, the Shining Path created a system of justice aimed at winning the local 
population over. “Public enemies” who stood trial under the Shining Path’s system could 
be anyone, including individuals from neighboring villages who violated the local code 
of conduct, boundary disputes, and even thievery.85  Often times, the population would 
not only support, but participate in these “popular trials” conducted by the leaders of 
Sendero Luminoso, which created a “pseudo local justice” system.86  The Shining Path 
was able to demonstrate “swift justice” for those who violated standing rules and 
regulations. 
Fourth, the Shining Path countered an existing tradition of favoring the capital 
and neglecting the hinterlands, and highlighted Indians over Hispanics.  Degregorio 
explains, 
[t]he founders of Sendero [formed] part of a long tradition of provincial 
elites who rose up against a system that concentrates everything in the 
capital, and who embraced indigenismo (glorification of Indian customs 
and traditions) as a reaction against the hispanismo (glorification of 
Hispanic customs and traditions) of the Lima upper classes.87 
This neglect from the wealthy upper classes played into the ideology of the Maoist based 
insurgency and gave added impetus to attacking the state; it also demonstrates, for 
purposes of this thesis, the challenges that this dynamic posed for the government to 
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regain control and legitimacy of its population. Peru’s demographics, therefore, set the 
stage for both the insurgency’s action and the government’s reaction. 
C. GUZMAN’S CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP 
The Shining Path found their leader in an intelligent individual by the name of 
Abimael Guzman.  Also known as “Comrade Gonzala,” Guzman was a philosophy 
professor at the National University of San Cristobal de Huamanga in Ayachucho.88  The 
charisma of Guzman turned the disenfranchised peasantry into a breeding ground for 
recruitment.  His network of followers was built upon a train-the-trainer type of model 
during the 20 years before Sendero’s attack on Peru’s reinstatement of national elections.  
His students were able, under the guise of education, to travel throughout the Regional 
villages and spread Guzman’s communistic views among an uneducated and vulnerable 
indigenous population.  McCormick adds to the importance that demographics played in 
the movement’s success by stating that, 
Guzman was able to borrow the concept of the peasant-based revolution 
and (his own interpretation of) the tenants of Chinese Marxism….  The 
synthesis of these concepts, suitably interpreted by Guzman himself, was 
to provide the ideological basis of the new socialist Peruvian state.  The 
revolution that would bring this “new state of workers and peasants” into 
being would logically begin among Peru’s traditional Indian populations, 
the direct descendants of the country’s socialist tradition.89 
Guzman’s background in education helped him become a natural teacher and 
leader within the organization.  His ability to instruct and communicate his beliefs to 
others led to growth and reproduction of ideology through his “students” then teaching 
others.  Strong goes on to explain the benefit of Guzman’s approach of reaching out to 
the peasant population through the idea of multiplication whereby “he [Guzman] created 
Shining Path’s main instrument of political penetration.  Once these students graduated 
and took up their posts as teachers, they became the initial backbone of the party 
structure.”90 
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Guzman’s ability to lead the now emerging Sendero Luminoso was not solely 
centered on his teaching ability.  Guzman possessed a highly charismatic, almost savior-
like, quality that gained him recruits.  McCormick further captures Guzman’s influential 
leadership in key characteristics, 
[a]uthority and control within Sendero, in this respect, appear to hinge on 
some variant of what has been termed the “charismatic leader-follower 
relationship.”  Such a relationship is based on four properties: (1) the 
group leader, in this case Abimael Guzman, is believed to have 
superhuman qualities; (2) group followers unquestionably accept the 
leader’s views, statements, and judgment; (3) they comply with his orders 
and directives without condition; and (4) they give the leader an 
unqualified devotion.91 
In Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Mark 
Juergensmeyer offers a useful framework for thinking about the conditions that led to 
Guzman’s messianic status.  Juergensmeyer coined the term “cosmic war,” which is a 
battle in which basic identity, dignity, and way of life are threatened, and in which all are 
required to participate so that Good can prevail over Evil.  Juergensmeyer refers to “such 
images as ‘cosmic’ because they are larger than life.  They evoke great battles of the 
legendary past, and they relate to metaphysical conflicts between good and evil.  Notions 
of cosmic war are intimately personal but can also be translated to the social plane.”92  
Juergensmeyer further argues, “[o]ne of the reasons a state of war is preferable to peace is 
that it gives moral justification to acts of violence.  Violence, in turn, offers the illusion of 
power.”93  Under these conditions, charismatic leadership can help mobilize and organize 
people through promises of salvific rewards. 
Guzman’s behavior and strategy conform to the logic of cosmic war. Degregori 
echoes this observation: 
Sendero’s epic then, is a cosmic one.  Its leaders are intellectual warriors 
in the service of a most exact science that regulates the universe like a  
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limitless cosmic ballet.  They must put everything in order according to 
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, overcoming or destroying whatever resists 
its ineluctable laws.94 
This “cosmic” environment created by Guzman continued to garner support and 
followers for the cause.  Strong’s study on Sendero Luminoso further adds that, 
…contemporary songs and poems demonstrate how Shining Path has been 
absorbed into Indian legend.  In these, the revolution is regarded as a 
pachacuti, a cosmic upheaval in which the world is reversed and a new 
age begins in which a social order is inverted.  At times, Guzman has been 
identified with the Inkarri, a mythical figure based on the decapitated Inca, 
Atahualpa.95 
Juergensmeyer goes on to say that, 
[t]he idea of warfare implies more than an attitude; ultimately it is a world 
view and an assertion of power.  To live in a state of war is to live in a 
world in which individuals know who they are, why they have suffered, by 
whose hand they have been humiliated, and at what expense they have 
persevered.  The concept of war provides cosmology, history, and 
eschatology and offers the reins of political control.96 
As with any cult-like organization, the leadership plays an integral role and the Shining 
Path is no different.  McCormick’s states, 
[i]solated and aloof, Guzman is nevertheless said to have shaped Sendero 
in his own image, exercising a strong personal hold over the movement’s 
agenda, direction, and doctrinal orientation.  Despite its national presence 
and size, now believed to be as large as 10,000 cadre, Sendero remains a 
highly individualized movement, established and based on the cult 
personality of Comrade Gonzalo.97 
As evidenced with Guzman and the indigenous population of Peru, an individual’s 
charismatic influence over a people or group carries great weight.  This persuasion over  
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the local populace is even more pronounced when the identified people or group are 
looking for leadership—a void often created when the country’s government fails to 
identify and support the population. 
D. AFTER AYACUCHO 
The Shining Path did not stay within the confines of rural Ayacucho, nor did it 
maintain the ‘peaceful’ relations with the peasantry as previously envisioned.  The 
government’s failure to react quickly following Sendero Luminoso’s attack against the 
voter registry offered the insurgency time and space.  This political power void was filled 
by the leadership ranks of the Shining Path.  Having been in and around the area for 
years, Guzman was now able to deploy his supporters into a more active role.  Village 
elders and municipal leaders either quit or were forced to resign.  Those who were 
removed by force were often made an example of by Sendero’s leadership.98  Thus the 
Shining Path went after the population for their alleged support of the government and 
the government went after the population for their alleged support of Sendero Luminoso.  
Much of the problem between Sendero Luminoso and the peasantry started when 
the local population began to realize that the insurgency’s ideology was not in line with 
the population.  Though the Shining Path was able to capitalize on its message in the 
early stages and win a support base through social services and opportunities for higher 
education, Sendero’s ideology and the expectations of the population began to diverge as 
“peasants began to realize that they were not participants in the revolution.”99  Rather, 
the village supporters took on a supporting role to the Shining Path.  Much of the 
population was forced into supplying the revolution with food, water, and personnel.  The 
result became the familiar mantra, “if you’re not for us, you’re against us.”  The film, 
State of Fear, shows through interviews and eyewitness accounts how the insurgents 
moved from village to village taking what they wanted, including child soldiers.  If the 
locals did not support them, they were, beaten, tortured, or publically executed.100 
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Within the first few years of the 1980s, the guerrilla arm of the insurgency was 
conducting increased operations within the rural outposts.  Guerrilla forces began 
conducting assassinations of local officials and civil police within Andahuaylas, a city 
located approximately 50km southeast of Ayacucho with roughly the same demographic 
makeup.  Though the government police and “counter-insurgency” units were deployed 
to the area by 1982, they were not only incapable of denying guerrilla activity, but, 
rather, further harmed the population through brutal interrogation techniques in the hopes 
of rooting out suspected Sendero Luminoso supporters.  The Shining Path moved into its 
urban strategy beginning in 1985 and took the fight to the city centers.  Two tactics of 
this changing strategy were to weaken logistical lines by conducting attacks along the 
Central Highway, and to weaken the urban infrastructure through political assassinations 
and “armed strikes.”101  Though not one act or tactic alone increased the threat of the 
growing insurgency, Smith writes that, “[w]ith carefully laid plans, centralized command, 
organization discipline, and meticulous care for detail, Guzman’s followers had strategic 
and tactical advantages over their political adversaries.”102 
E. THE GOVERNMENT’S COUNTER STRATEGY FROM THE TOP 
DOWN 
By the mid-1980s, Guzman had absolute control over the Shining Path and moved 
to expand the group’s operations from the rural mountainous region to the capital of Peru.  
Guzman’s autonomous leadership over the organization to direct operations proved to be 
a key vulnerability of the insurgency and eventually opened the door for the government 
to capitalize on it.  Before this move, the government essentially ignored the problem 
until it came to the doorsteps of the capital.  Once in the capital, 
Shining Path recorded 5,350 “actions.”  Of these, 1,100 acts of violence 
were recorded by the Ministry of the Interior….Court houses, state 
companies, local government buildings, political party offices, banks,  
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union headquarters, hotels, factories, shops, embassies and churches were 
fire-bombed….Newspaper offices were bombed and radio stations 
occupied.103 
This tactical expansion was a strategic mistake for the Shining Path because it 
pressured the Peruvian military to focus on the movement now that it was attacking the 
capital and the wealthy elites who lived there.  Furthermore, the attacks in the capital not 
only highlighted the insurgency, but provided the military and police with intelligence 
opportunities to target Shining Path leadership.  Strong continues, 
Amid a big increase in attacks in Lima, with the dynamiting and fire-
bombing of police stations, department stores, petrol stations, embassies, 
restaurants, banks, hotels, offices and factories; and amid the killing in the 
capital of dozens of policemen and political leaders, a night curfew was 
declared in February 1986.104 
The government of Peru continued to struggle with the growing insurgency 
through the 1980’s.  Then in November, 1991, a year after his first election to power, 
President Alberto Fujimori issued his first of several anti-terrorist decrees.  His intent was 
to ultimately deploy the military and utilize them in their capacity to root out and destroy 
this threating insurgency, which was threating both the urban population centers as well 
as the country’s economic prosperity.  Additionally, the government realized that it was 
now in a different battle, one that was not only focused on violent activities, but also a 
propaganda battle for legitimacy.  Some of the problems with these initial decrees were 
that they offered the military basically full access and power to combat the threat.  Strong 
gives evidence to this, 
[t]he armed forces were also allowed to occupy schools and universities.  
Further, they were given overall control of the prisons.  These moves led 
to a stepping-up in the killing of students and the prison massacre in May 
1992.  Meanwhile, the effect of the censorship laws was, naturally, to 
muzzle the opposition, the media and reports of human rights abuses.105 
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The Peruvian Army’s brutal tactics fed the growth of the insurgency with 
extensive human rights abuses.  Realizing that these tactics were not only delegitimizing 
the government, but also fueling the mobilization of the Shining Path, the Peruvian Army 
developed a “hearts and minds” counter-insurgency campaign beginning in 1990.106 
This new campaign centered on assisting the indigenous rural population while 
also developing and training peasant militias to counter the Shining Path.107  The military 
was apprehensive at first, but soon demonstrated greater support for the new 
governmental initiative to arm and train these peasant militias known as “rondas 
campesinas locally, or Civil Defense Committees—CDCs by the army.”108  The 
government began this operation by giving weapons to the Ashanika people, in an 
attempt to help them both fight for themselves, and expand the reach of the 
government.109  In turn, the hope was to deny the freedom of maneuver the Shining Path 
had gained through the rural areas and to delegitimize the organization. 
The rural campaign was an essential component to the counterinsurgency 
strategy.  Taking the fight to the enemy in their area of operations did two things.  First, it 
demonstrated to the local populace that the government did, in fact, have an interest in 
their safety and security.  This newly acquired support by the indigenous population 
drove the second factor.  It not only began to generate actionable intelligence, but more 
importantly, it denied the insurgency their freedom of maneuver and began to disrupt 
their sanctuary. 
This holistic counter-insurgency strategy was effective in turning the tide of the 
insurgency in Peru, but it also relied upon one critical tactic to destroy the Shining Path: 
leadership targeting.  To do this, the Peruvian President needed to take full control of 
governmental agencies.  In a public address in April, 1992, President Albert Fujimori 
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“temporarily dissolved congress.”110  The population, though skeptical, sympathized with 
the country’s leadership in order to give up their social rights in the hopes to protect their 
future and security.  Not only were the people scared of the impending attacks of Sendero 
Luminoso, but saw President Fujimori as an outsider capable of bringing a new ideas and 
strategies to combat the terror.111 
The Peruvian government developed an elite police intelligence unit solely to 
target Shining Path leadership called the Grupo Especial de Inteligencia (Special 
Intelligence Group, GEIN).112  Led by Benedicto Jimenez, GEIN was essential to the 
counter-terror campaign of the Peruvian government.  The small unit, formed originally 
in 1989, initially comprised only five personnel with substandard equipment.113  The 
primary mission of GEIN was to track down and capture Sendero leadership.114  After a 
change in political control, President Fujimori decided to extend greater authority to 
GEIN, which proved to be extremely fruitful by not only capturing dozens of Guzman’s 
senior level lieutenants in 1991, but by capturing Guzman himself in a Lima safe house in 
the fall of 1992.115  The unit captured a home video of Guzman and multiple others of 
Shining Path’s leadership.  From this video, GEIN was able to isolate Guzman to an 
upper floor of a dance studio located in Lima, Peru, where he was captured on September 
12, 1992.116 
Following the capture of Guzman, GEIN was able to kill or capture hundreds of 
militants and Shining Path leaders, which ultimately led to the group’s demise.  David 
Scott Palmer highlights the success and impact of Guzman’s capture by stating that, 
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[b]y the end of 1994, Shining Path, while still a nuisance in some parts of 
the country, had ceased to pose a threat to the Peruvian state.  Clearly, the 
new counterinsurgency strategy played a major role in such a dramatic 
turn of events.117 
However, this approach to leadership targeting also came with some important 
limitations and drawbacks. As a form of dictatorship, President Fujimori was able to 
exercise singular power of the military and additionally formed agencies.  This allowed 
the president the capability to employ and direct the GEIN where he saw fit in order to 
defeat the Shining Path.  This singular ownership, however, greatly increased the 
likelihood of war crimes, atrocities against the public and government, as well as military 
corruption.  Without the checks and balances, these crimes resulted in negative public 
opinion amongst the population and the removal of the Fujimori regime following a 
botched third election attempt in 2003. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The importance of terrorist leadership is the critical variable that drives the 
networks, provides operational directives, determines mobilization and finances, provides 
religious legitimacy, and even affects morale. Sendero Luminoso, and the leadership of 
Guzman, coupled with the demographic and geographic safe haven provided by the 
Peruvian hinterland, presented an opportunity to dismantle the insurgent group by 
targeting its leaders. However, several key variables had to be in play for this strategy to 
work. 
Ultimately, the actions of Sendero Luminoso itself led to the loss of their safe 
haven within the rural areas of Peru. The Shining Path’s initial strategy of assimilating to 
the local populace and offering them great opportunities for advancement proved to be 
highly effective towards recruitment and support.  However, when local villages did not 
fall in line with the emerging insurgency, Sendero Luminoso began recruiting in a more 
violent, forceful manner.  Death threats and executions of the local population within 
rural areas began to separate the Shining Path from its support base.  Guzman’s heavy 
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handed actions, coupled with the government’s positive support to the people, resulted in 
loss of maneuverability by the Shining Path and drove them out of their sanctuary. 
Once Sendero Luminoso lost its safe haven, the Peruvian government could take 
action aimed at destroying the movement through leadership targeting. First, the 
government’s role in establishing a counter-insurgency strategy was foundational to the 
overall success of undermining Sendero Luminoso.  Like Guzman, Fujimori was able to 
identify a strong concern of the population and capitalize on their needs.  The threat 
facing the population centers at this point was so great that the people were more 
reluctant to give up their rights under congress for the hopes of a more secure future.  The 
approach allowed Fujimori to maintain total control over operational activities combating 
the terrorist threat.  The military and police became a “stove-piped” entity and all 
information was channeled through Fujimori.  This control allowed Fujimori to institute 
operations without the time consuming consent of congress, which then allowed all 
successes of the operation to point to him.  Operations then were able to be quick and 
decisive. 
The negative impacts of this approach, however, resulted in the military and law 
enforcement’s “blank check.”  This aggressive approach by the Peruvian leader required 
results, often times at the detriment of the population it was designed to protect.  
Additionally, governmental change in the exercise of power compromised the democratic 
make up of Peru and transformed it into one appearing to have more dictator-like 
qualities.  After the removal of the Fujimori regime, the newly elected President Garcia 
instituted “the so-called Libro Verde, or Green Book.  The plan envisioned stronger 
executive control, a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, and the implementation 
of free market principles to restore the economy.”118 
The second implementation of the effective strategy was the use of “rondas” or 
“CDCs.”  Though good in vision, the implementation of such tactics was slow.  The 
majority of the military did not speak the rural, indigenous dialects.119  This resulted in 
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confusion, brutal tactics against the rural population, and a negative view of the 
government.  However, over time, select individuals from the indigenous population were 
attached to military units.  This was essential to the success of their operations because 
the locals “knew the community, spoke the local language or dialect, and often could help 
the military unit communicate with locals and gather better information on the Shining 
Path sympathizers and operations.”120  The growing success of the military led to a more 
restrictive area for the insurgency to maneuver in, as well as to both the government and 
population assuming roles in stopping the negative effects of Sendero Luminoso. 
Lastly, the widening net cast by the successes of the military and police allowed 
for greater information gathering.  This gathered intelligence was applied in targeting 
Shining Path leadership and, ultimately, against Abimael Guzman Reynoso.  Guzman’s 
initial promises for advancement were unmet, and his image, which was assumed by 
Sendero Luminoso, was now largely tarnished due to their horrific tactics against the 
people.  This negative association provided the government the opportunity to pursue and 
target the insurgency’s leadership because of the lack of available sanctuary. 
The implementation of a decapitation strategy by the Peruvian government has 
proven to be a successful one.  Although there remain small pockets and an insignificant 
resurgence by the Shining Path within Peru, their ability for future sustainment does not 
currently pose an overwhelming threat to governmental organization and the Peruvian 
population any time soon.121 
                                                 
120 Palmer, “Countering Terrorism,” 298. 
121 Ibid., 303. 
 47 
IV. CONTAINMENT IN ALGIERS: CONTROLLING THE 
OUTPUT 
Containment strategies aim to encircle adversaries with the aim of restricting their 
operations and plans. Though often complex in execution, the idea of containment can be 
broken down into two simple distinct categories; strategic; and tactical.  The strategic 
form of containment aims to quarantine and isolate states through diplomatic activities 
(condemnation from the United Nations), sanctions (economic embargos), and some 
military actions (threat of force, sea blockades).  Perhaps one of the greatest incidents of 
strategic containment occurred in the decades following World War II, in which the 
United States faced a new enemy—the Soviet Union and communism. The United States 
employed a variety of means aimed at preventing the spread of Soviet power and 
influence, including nuclear deterrence, the placement of conventional forces, economic 
sanctions, strategic communications, proxy forces, and development and aid to 
vulnerable states. 
Tactical containment is largely dependent upon certain geographic conditions and 
is used to quarantine a specific enemy by physically preventing their movement into or 
out of an area. A useful analogy of tactical containment is a dam at the end of a river or a 
barrier to prevent an oil spill from leaking further into the ocean; the goal is to stop the 
movement of a contagion through the creation of physical barriers, such as walls, 
barricades, checkpoints, and other obstacles that prevent the free flow of objects, 
including people. 
This chapter will investigate the French effort to tactically contain insurgents in 
Algeria during the mid-1950’s to early 1960’s, specifically in Algeria’s capital, the port 
city of Algiers, which became the epicenter of the struggle for independence.  The French 
strategy of containment was to literally wall off the Casbah neighborhood in Algiers—the 
urban safe haven of the insurgents—and to destroy the organization from within the 
walled compound. 
Though the war for Algerian independence from France was long and protracted, 
this study will focus primarily on the urban conflict with the country’s capital of Algiers 
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from mid-1956 to the fall of 1957.  In the first section of this chapter, the study will 
provide the cultural and demographic background for the belligerents involved.  Second, 
the study will systematically examine the tactical strategy of containment utilized by the 
French to combat the threat.  Finally, the chapter will weigh the benefits, potential risks 
involved, and measure of effectiveness to a state that utilizes tactical containment to 
counter insurgent and terrorist safe havens. 
A. GEOGRAPHY AND FRENCH COLONIALIZATION 
Located on the northern coast of Africa, Algeria has direct access to the 
Mediterranean Sea and is approximately 80 miles off the southern coast of Spain.  The 
coastline makes up around 16 percent of the entire modern day border.  By land, Algeria 
is bordered by several nations that have made international headlines in recent years, 
including Libya to the East, and Mali on the southwestern border.  Together with the 
Western Sahara, this region is historically known as the Maghrib. 
Due to its complex geographic position, Algeria has long been subject to 
numerous transient people and trading routes.  Many of the original settlers of today’s 
Algeria were from the tribal people known as the Berbers.  One historical narrative of the 
country mentions, “[t]he word Berber goes back to the Greeks, who called the people 
they found living in the Maghrib at the dawn of history barbarians, a terminology 
subsequently adopted in various forms by Romans, Arabs, Europeans, and others.”122  
Due to its rich coastal area, the Phoenicians took up residence within the country, 
although it was later taken over by the Carthaginians during the eighth century. 123  After 
nearly six and a half centuries of control, the area was overthrown by the Roman Empire, 
but fell to the Vandals in 430 A.D.124 
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The region continued to change hands until the “Arab invasion of the seventh 
century brought about the Arabization of many cities and several coastal areas….”125  In 
the 1700s, U.S. and European forces battled the persistent presence of Barbary pirates 
along Algeria’s coast until it was formally “proclaimed and integral part of France by the 
constitution,” in November, 1848.126  The Encyclopedia of the Nations notes, 
Al-Jazair, as it was called in Arabic, became, in French, Algérie, a name 
that France applied to the territory for the first time in 1839. In 1848, 
northern Algeria… was organized into three provinces. Following the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, large numbers of Alsatians and other 
French colonizers settled the most fertile confiscated lands, as did other 
Europeans at the invitation of France. Muslims had no political rights 
except for limited participation in local financial delegations.127 
The French built upon the naturally segregated geographic, economic and 
demographic influences in the region.  Within the capital, historian Ruedy highlights that, 
“[s]ociologically, the main divisions of the Algerian city were quarters, ethnic 
communities, and guilds.”128  These demographic and geographic quarters in turn created 
natural boundaries between the Muslim locals and colonial French due to specific trades 
and businesses associated with the urban population.  Many of the urban quarters 
appeared to be self-sufficient, which further segregated the groups and limited 
interaction. 
Tensions between the local population and the French began to emerge during the 
two World Wars.  Prior to these wars, the French Constitution, which was established in 
1848, separated the Algerian colony’s citizenship from their Arab and Berber 
nationalism.  According to Parolin, “Algerian natives were not full-fledged citizens and 
were governed by a special Code de l’Indigénat applied by administrative, not judicial, 
authorities.”129  These tensions grew when, in World War I, France promised the 
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Algerian population that supported France in the war that they would receive increased 
freedoms in exchange for military service. Despite greater liberties not being granted 
during the interwar period, Algerians supported and fought on behalf of France during 
World War II as well. 
To voice their opinion and desire for an autonomous nation, a Muslim leader by 
the name of Ferhat Abbas drew up a nine page “Manifesto” in 1943, which described 
Algerians’ desire for independence.130  The Muslim community began a peaceful 
demonstration in the town of Sétif, calling for both independence and the release of the 
leader Messali Hadj.131  The Muslim demonstration soon transpired into a violent 
confrontation with local police.  The exchange between local police and the 
demonstrators enraged the local community, resulting in the gruesome murder of more 
than a hundred European settlers and the wounding of over a hundred more.132 
In response, different groups of indigenous fighters, or fellaghas, emerged out of 
these struggles.133  One such fellagha that came to light during this time was the National 
Liberation Front, or FLN.  One source argues, 
[t]he FLN emerged in 1954 from an impasse within traditional nationalist 
organizations led by Messali Hadj and Ferhat Abbas.  It represented a new 
generation of activists who rejected compromise with the colonial 
authorities.  For them, the armed struggle was the only way ahead.134 
It was the FLN, or Front de Libération Nationale, which aimed to become the only 
leadership for Algerians. Many members of the FLN had grown up in a military 
environment; this relationship with the military had a great impact on the organizational 
structure, tactics, and strategy of the insurgency.  The FLN became the political arm of 
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the insurgency, rallying the rebellion, and the Army of National Liberation, or ALN, was 
the interconnected militant arm that fought their colonial masters.135 
B. INSURGENCY 
In November 1954, the FLN released its “Proclamation,” which highlighted, 
among other things, its organizational goal for “National Liberation through: 1) the 
restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework 
of the principles of Islam; 2) the preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without 
distinction of race or religion.”136  Though there were multiple factions throughout 
Algeria during the years leading up to the formation of the FLN, by the time their 
“Proclamation” was produced, nearly all separate entities had assimilated and joined the 
FLN in one large Arab nationalist movement. 
In order to manage the movement, a council of Arab elders was held in 
Switzerland during the summer of 1954 to establish control throughout Algeria.137  At 
the conclusion of the meeting, a small contingent of the Arab leadership returned to 
Algeria where they conducted a “war council.”138  It was here that the separated 
leadership decided to break up the country of Algeria into six zones, known as 
wilayas.139  Each zone, or newly formed command, was then run by each of the five 
elders who were present during the “war council” meeting; the Sahara, however, was left 
vacant.  These wilayas, along with the increasing French pressure throughout the region, 
not only further isolated the Muslim community from its French counterparts, but 
provided safe havens and sanctuaries for the militant leadership to recruit, train, and 
mobilize.  
Algerian historian Clark argues that understanding that the small insurgency was 
facing a large, combat proven French military: 
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[t]he objective of most FLN leaders was, therefore, to win a political 
victory.  They sought to create a climate of insecurity that would bring 
Algeria to the attention of the world, and assert a moral claim for 
independence that would isolate France diplomatically.140   
The intent for the FLN was to capitalize on native Algerians’ perceived 
grievances and bring their cause to the forefront of the international community.  The 
objective, therefore, was two-fold: to gain support of the local populace, and make up for 
their lack of operational capabilities through external support.  In the case of the FLN, 
this support was sought specifically from the United Nations (UN). 
In September, 1956, the FLN began bombing French cafes and local 
establishments, increasing terrorist activities, which further aggravated the relationships 
between the ‘isolated’ Muslim communities and French colonialists.  The FLN strategy 
conforms to the logic outlined by Kydd and Walter, who argue that successful terrorist 
strategies have five principles: “attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and 
outbidding.”141  These principle strategies are vital to the success of the organization.  
However, they alone may not be sufficient.  Kydd and Walter go on to state, 
[t]o obtain their political goals, terrorists need to provide credible 
information to the audiences whose behavior they hope to influence.  
Terrorists play two key audiences: governments whose policies they wish 
to influence and individuals on the terrorists’ own side whose support or 
obedience they seek to gain.142 
This dynamic between the terrorists, their means of influence, and their hoped-for 
outcomes is visible in the film, The Battle of Algiers.143  In the film, Ali la Pointe, a street 
thief who goes on to be one of the last FLN leaders standing, finds himself caught up in 
an angry mob of Arabs who are heading down to the French quarter to retaliate against 
French bombings of their homes.  A boy who follows the group attempts to stop Ali, 
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Boy: “Jaffar says you must stop.  Listen to me Ali.  Don’t go down there.  
The Army will slaughter us.  Listen to me.” 
Ali la Pointe: “Get out of here…. Halt!” 
El-hadi Jaffar: “Stay calm!  The FLN will avenge you!  The FLN will 
avenge you!”144 
The FLN and its leadership realized at the early stages of the conflict that in order 
to gain the support of the local populace and further the cause, they needed to become a 
legitimate organization in both the eyes of the people and the French government.  They 
attempted to do this by protecting the people and standing up for their rights, and to be 
their voice.  Conversely, for an organization to rise up in the face of the government, they 
need the backing of the population.  As Galula writes, 
[t]he importance of a cause, an absolute essential at the outset of an 
insurgency, decreases progressively as the insurgent acquires strength.  
The war itself becomes the principle issue, forcing the population to takes 
sides, preferably the winning one.145 
The FLN sought to take their grievance and advance it to the next level by 
mobilizing the population to push against the current regime.  Kydd and Walter say that, 
[p]rovocation helps shift citizen support away from the incumbent regime.  
In a provocation strategy, terrorists seek to goad the target government 
into a military response that harms civilians within the terrorist 
organization’s home territory.  The aim is to convince them that the 
government is so evil that the radical goals of the terrorists are justified 
and support for their organization is warranted.146 
This “goading” of the French military by the FLN commenced on 20 August, 
1955, a clash that came to be known as the Philippeville Massacre.147  Members of the 
FLN brutally executed and dismembered 123 French colonialists and wounded numerous 
others.  This FLN aggression solidified the French military’s intervention.  Chalmers  
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Johnson suggests that it was this violent act against the French population that instituted a 
similar method of brutality by the French military towards the Muslim community during 
the Battle of Algiers.148 
Increasing pressure by the French military on the insurgents and the population 
resulted in a greater number of terrorist attacks.  Alexander, Evans, and Keiger state that, 
“In response to this crisis, FLN leaders conferred in the Soumman Valley in August 1956 
and decided to launch the Battle of Algiers.”149  FLN leaders established six objectives in 
order to weaken the French response: 
1. Total weakening of the French Army so as to deprive it of any possibility 
of a victory imposed by force of arms; 
2. Large-scale deterioration of the colonialist economy by sabotage so as to 
make the normal administration of the country impossible; 
3. Maximum disturbance of the economic and social situation in France so as 
to make the continuation of the war impossible; 
4. Political isolation of France in Algeria and in the world; 
5. Development of the insurrection in such a way as to make it conform to 
international law (personalization of the army, recognizable political 
power, respect for the rules of war, normal administration of the zones 
freed by the Army of National Liberation); 
6. Constant action to bolster the people against the French attempts at 
extermination.150 
Though the FLN had been active through the hinterlands of Algeria, the leadership 
decided it was time for a more pronounced attack.  To do this, the FLN, as noted by 
Galula, “realized that they could achieve the greatest psychological effect on the French 
and on world opinion at the cheapest price by stepping up terrorism in the main cities, 
notably Algiers….”151 
In late 1956, the FLN felt they were nearing a vote in the UN that would gain 
them their independence and so put pressure on Arab leaders within the international 
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community to increase awareness of their struggle.152  To demonstrate the resolve and 
unity of the Algerian community, a coordinated workers’ strike began on 28 January 
1957, and lasted eight days before laborers were forced back to work.  “So well 
supported by Muslims was the strike that it all but shut down retail commerce and 
manufacturing across Algeria.”153  This strike, coupled with the urban terrorism against 
the French population and infrastructure, was intended to be the final ‘surge’ to achieve 
an Arab victory over their French colonial oppressors. 
The FLN, now led by Saadi Yacef and Ali Ammar, alias Ali la Pointe, greatly 
increased terrorist operations in September1956 by conducting “eighty-five separate 
attacks within the city limits of Algiers, killing twenty-four persons and wounding 
116.”154  These types of operations “became a core FLN tactic,” and included selectively 
placed bombs at least four separate times during the first six months of 1957.155  This 
series of attacks set the stage for the French response, which became known as the Battle 
of Algiers. 
C. COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Though France had declared a “state of emergency” in 1957, requiring the mass 
deployment of military forces to the region, French forces continued to struggle with the 
growing insurgency that was threatening its control of Algeria.156  In order to provide 
relief and protection to its French population in Algeria, France developed a two-fold 
strategy: military intervention coupled with a hefty distribution of propaganda.   
In 1956, prior to the declaration of a state of emergency, France developed and 
deployed the Fifth Bureau in support of operations in Algeria. Their mission was to 
support ground forces by developing a leaflet that would influence both French nationals 
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living in Algeria as well as Arab Algerians.157  Their goal was to develop a propaganda 
system that “was based on a campaign of awareness and explanation whose central theme 
was one of reconciliation between France and Algeria.”158  Additionally, the 
psychological campaign was wrapped up in the education of both the French and Muslim 
populations’ understanding of a positive future relationship as colonial country and to 
instill a sense of camaraderie and unity between France and Algeria.159  Messaging 
changed over the years but never took the primary role in operations and was utilized 
instead as a force-multiplier, aimed to compliment military operations. 
Algiers’ importance as the capital and a port city made it the center of gravity for 
the conflict between French military forces and guerrilla insurgents.  The French 
surmised that the FLN was now operating within the urban city centers due to its 
increased attacks and intelligence gained from French controlled areas.  The Casbah 
quarter, in particular, provided both a geographic and demographic safe haven for the 
insurgents. Prior to the onslaught of the Battle of Algiers in September, 1956, the Muslim 
community was already segregated from the French population in the Casbah, making it 
an ideal location for insurgents to hide out.  Furthermore, the windy roads and tightly 
stacked buildings made movement slow for French forces.  This congested urban 
environment allowed for any identified insurgent to fall away and blend back in to a 
geographic and demographic safe haven. 
The French understood the importance of the Casbah as a safe haven for the FLN. 
As Galula notes, “[g]eographic factors are what they are and cannot be significantly 
changed or influenced except by displacing the population - an absurdity in peacetime—
or by building artificial fences….”160  Though there were already 400,000 French 
soldiers supporting the Algerian conflict by March 1956, the FLN still maintained the 
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ability to maneuver and raise support for their cause.161  Realizing the Casbah provided a 
natural safe haven for the FLN to recruit, train, and educate their support base, the French 
sought to cut off this area from the rest of its surroundings.   
In 1956, the French civil authorities named General Jacques Massu and his 10th 
Parachute Division to direct the battle within Algiers.162  The urban terrain of the Casbah 
presented key choke points and natural boundaries that greatly restricted the freedom of 
movement traveling in and out of the sanctuary.  General Massu sought to quarantine the 
problem by restricting the flow of personnel in and out of the Casbah and therefore 
controlling its violent outputs.   
The film, The Battle of Algiers, depicts France’s containment strategy and the 
control of the urban Casbah.163  Pontecorvo, the film’s director, depicts techniques used 
by French paratroopers to tighten the noose around the FLN.  The quarantine was initially 
enforced by instituting a curfew and conducting military patrols.  Military patrols were 
given strict orders by General Massu to engage and fire upon anything that moved.  
“They [the French military on patrol] left the dead [FLN] in the streets where they had 
been shot: there was no time to take care of the bodies and the population had to see 
them.  To acquire credibility the paratroopers had to be even more extreme than the 
FLN.”164 
In support of these patrols, General Massu brought in elements of French Special 
Operations Forces, primarily the 11th Shock Battalion and the Service de Documention 
Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE) in 1955.165  The 11th Shock targeted the 
FLN with “booby-trapped” devices.  The SDECE performed a similar role as the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States, and conducted espionage against the 
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enemy.166  A 1955 French Special Powers Act granted the military responsibility and 
legal authority for “public order, security of persons and property….”167  These powers 
allowed General Massu and his troops to undertake the roles similar to a police force, but 
also allowed them to conduct military operations within the Casbah. 
The military, now wearing multiple hats (military, police, public-works mangers) 
aimed to collect actionable intelligence in order decrease the amount of violent FLN 
actions.  To do this, the Special Powers Act gave the military the authority to arrest and 
detain any persons they felt were a threat.  These arrests, coupled with the use of torture 
in some cases, produced significant intelligence, though the techniques utilized were later 
regarded as questionable and inhumane.  General Aussaresses’ memoirs claim: “While 
torture was widely used in Algeria, it didn’t mean that it was an ordinary occurrence.”168 
Pontecorvo, writer and director of the film, The Battle of Algiers, depicts the 
utilization of intelligence by General Massu and the French Paratroopers as having a 
“domino effect.”  In other words, French security aimed to arrest the “low hanging fruit” 
as a means of gaining intelligence that would provide follow-on missions that would 
eventually allow them to continue to move up the terrorist tree towards the upper 
echelons of the FLN leadership and target the brains of the organization.169 
Once the quarantine of the Casbah was put in place, the daytime movement of 
personnel was controlled through the use of military check points and film 
surveillance.170  The French required proper documentation for all personnel entering or 
leaving the area.  These strict measures led to the arrest of FLN leader Yacef in 
September of 1957.171  The following month, “Ali la Point” was killed by paratroopers 
after failing to surrender when cornered in the Casbah.172  General Massu’s physical 
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containment of the Casbah effectively allowed the French to control terrorist outputs and 
then surgically attack the organization that was isolated within the contained area. 
The French use of containment on a tactical level was so successful, however, that 
following the Battle of Algiers, the French implemented a larger scale version of 
containment, taking it to a strategic level.  Galula explains, 
[i]n Algeria, the French naval blockade and the sealing of the borders 
prevented the flow of supplies to Algeria from Tunisia and Morocco, 
where large rebel stocks had been accumulated.  No development was 
possible.  The situation of the FLN forces after 1959 became so critical 
that most of their automatic weapons were buried for lack of 
ammunition.173 
Though General Massu’s paratroopers successfully controlled the FLN’s terrorist 
operations from their Casbah safe haven through the use of containment, and France 
developed a wider containment strategy aimed at defeating the insurgents, Algerians 
ultimately won their independence in 1962 because of the loss of French popular support 
for the war. 
D. CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS 
The two primary dynamics influencing the Battle of Algiers were the geographic 
terrain of the Casbah and the demographic makeup of the residing population.  Prior to 
the 1957 battle, the FLN had already isolated itself from the French and the Arab 
communities had separated themselves from the rest of their colonial population in an 
attempt to demonstrate to the UN that they were, indeed, a free state, capable of 
maintaining their autonomy from the French. Additionally, the two opposing forces were 
not of the same culture, but separated by the heritages of French colonialists and Arab 
settlers.  The segregation of groups provided a demographic safe haven within the Casbah 
from the French military and remaining colonial population, thus increasing the FLN’s 
ability to more readily recruit, train, and develop legitimacy with their supporters than 
could the French.  This isolation allowed for effective insurgent training and recruiting, 
but also made the movement vulnerable to attack.  Furthermore, the urban infrastructure 
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provided boundaries, restricted movement, and created ideal choke points to control 
access.   These two factors, geography and demography, greatly enhanced the French 
military’s implementation of a tactical containment strategy. 
Though the French did not deny the entire urban safe haven to the FLN, 
containing the Casbah effectively disrupted insurgent operations and slowed the 
movement’s spread to other areas.  Additionally, this containment allowed for a more 
concentrated use of force within a confined area, rather than chasing the enemy 
throughout the Algerian Sahara or neighboring countries.  Furthermore, France’s 
containment strategy put the French on the offensive and allowed their forces to 
determine the time and place of engagement.  Tactical containment permitted the 
paratroopers to mitigate the risk to their troops based on collected intelligence, as well as 
minimize civilian casualties through a more targeted approach against FLN leadership, 
rather than through chance contact.  With regard to the ‘tactical factors’ of containment, 
Galula supports General Massu’s initiative by stating that, 
the counterinsurgent must pay particular attention to whether the area can 
be easily isolated and compartmented by taking advantage of natural 
obstacles, sea, rivers, plains….  If natural boundaries are lacking, 
consideration must be given to building artificial ones.174 
Though not specifically cited here by Galula, one can make the inference that the urban 
terrain can pose many advantages as well as disadvantages to the counterinsurgent.  A 
confined environment allows for a more focused area to target for intelligence, as well as 
preventing both sides from rapid, open movement.  The high concentration of a 
population also restricts the counterinsurgent from openly engaging the insurgent due to 
the risk of collateral damage, which would most likely become propaganda for insurgents 
to gain popular support. 
Along with the challenges posed by geographic restrictions, demographics also 
play a critical role in insurgent and counterinsurgent operations.  In many cases, there is a 
natural separation between the local population and counterinsurgent forces.  This 
segregation from the counterinsurgent provides a natural level of security for the 
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insurgent who is able to fall away and blend back in to his surroundings.  Furthermore, 
this separation often prevents the counterinsurgent from freely moving throughout the 
area and going unnoticed.  The level of support to the insurgents may not be strong; it 
some cases it may be derived from coercion. It is, therefore, vitally important for the 
counterinsurgent force to destroy the root of the problem and demonstrate to the local 
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V. PSEUDO OPERATIONS IN RHODESIA 
A pseudo operations, “indicates the use of organized teams which are disguised as 
guerrilla groups for the long- or short-term penetration of insurgent controlled areas.”175  
The tactic of masking oneself as the enemy is as old as warfare, but effectively applying a 
pseudo strategy requires special skills, carefully selected individuals, command and 
control, and patience.  As described in Chapter II, pseudo operators have been used to 
infiltrate terrorist safe havens and networks to garner actionable intelligence, conduct 
strikes, and sow distrust amongst terror groups. This strategy focuses on destroying a 
network from within and destroying the group’s operational capacity. Pseudo teams, 
comprised of “turned” insurgents who have been extensively vetted, provide a deep 
penetration strategy that is extremely useful for effectively targeting terrorist groups in 
safe havens. 
This chapter analyzes the implementation of the pseudo operations strategy 
through the lens of the Selous Scouts in Rhodesia. The Selous’ tactical success combating 
two communist insurgencies during the Rhodesian Civil War is unparalleled by any other 
special operations unit and provides a valuable analysis for understanding the conceptual 
framework and doctrine of pseudo operations.  This chapter will also illuminate the 
advantages and disadvantages of conducting pseudo operations while illustrating the 
viability of the strategy to disrupt or defeat terrorist safe havens. 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  The first section offers a history of pseudo ops, 
including their use in the Mau Mau rebellion, in the Malay Revolt, and in the Rhodesian 
Bush War. The second section offers a history of the Rhodesian Civil War pitting the 
white Rhodesian government against communist backed African insurgencies seeking 
majority rule.  The insurgents sought control of the country after the Rhodesian 
government issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11, 
1965, formally severing colonial ties with the British.  The third and fourth sections 
analyze the development of the Selous Scouts of Rhodesia and their operations 
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combating two insurgencies gripping the country.  The final section analyzes the 
strengths and weaknesses of a pseudo operations strategy in combating terrorist safe 
havens and highlights the strategic utility of pseudo operators. 
A. THE HISTORY OF PSEUDO TEAMS 
Initial doctrinal use of pseudo teams was developed by General Sir Frank Kitson 
of the British Army while fighting the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya, which spanned 
from 1952–1960.176  Kitson arrived in Kenya in 1953 and found that the sweeps the 
British were conducting were not producing results.177  Kitson devised a plan of 
“turning” captured Mau Mau insurgents and employing them against the insurgency by 
penetrating insurgent networks for intelligence gathering. Kitson’s pseudo groups 
devastated the Mau Mau and were far more effective than the aerial bombardment and 
massive conventional sweeps that preceded their employment.178     
Kitson used his extensive experience of using pseudo operations against the Mau 
Mau as a template for executing operations in Malaya, where the colonial government 
battled a communist insurgency from 1948–1960.179  According to Arquilla, the 
communist guerrillas were “almost completely unable to cope with this new approach to 
fighting them.”180  By 1960, Kitson and the British had quelled the guerrilla problem in 
Malaya and developed and proven a new doctrinal approach that would soon be 
mimicked in the 1965–1980 Rhodesian Bush War by a special operations unit known as 
the Selous Scouts.181 
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B. THE RHODESIAN CIVIL WAR 
The Rhodesian Civil War was a bloody conflict between a white minority ruling 
government and communist insurgencies in southern Africa from 1965–1980.182  Fearing 
that the British government was planning to transfer power of the colony to majority rule, 
the Rhodesian government’s issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 
November 11, 1965, formally cutting colonial ties with the British.  Britain and the 
United States resisted the UDI’s bid for independence; they immediately ceased trade 
with the Rhodesians and vowed not to recognize the white minority government.183  
Neighboring African states also feared that the Rhodesians would exert greater influence 
in southern Africa following the declaration and, therefore, were wary of their 
independence. 
The bid for Rhodesian independence triggered an African insurgency that sought 
to overthrow the isolated white Rhodesian government. The African bid for independence 
was led by the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), which was run by Joshua 
Nkomo.  The ZAPU developed a military wing to fight the Rhodesian security forces 
known as the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), which was grounded in 
a Soviet styled Marxist-Leninist ideology.184  Another party, the Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe, also had a militant wing known as the 
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). This militia followed a Maoist 
ideology.185 
Each militant wing established its own safe havens. ZIPRA focused their efforts 
on developing a conventional force based on advice from the Soviets and were 
headquartered in Zambia.186  ZANLA focused their efforts on the tribes of Rhodesia for a 
safe haven; these tribes populated isolated vast expanses of terrain in the north.  ZANLA 
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sought to exploit the small size of the Rhodesian security apparatus, where the white 
population of Rhodesia in 1965 was a meager 250,000.187  Historian Peter Baxter 
contends, “Bearing in mind the size of the country, and despite a continuing reliance on 
the black rank and file, there were simply too few whites to be in all places at once.  The 
revised guerrilla strategy sought to exploit this signature weakness.”188 
ZANLA insurgents methodically infiltrated villages and subverted the populace 
by establishing political commissars to establish a foothold amongst the indigenous 
population.  The commissars would set up camps within local villages and would appeal 
to the tribesman with a clever nationalist ideology and revolutionary rhetoric, garnering 
popular support within the ungoverned bush territories.189  The popular support they 
established within these geographically isolated areas became demographic safe havens 
for the African guerrillas where native tribesman had an indigenous power structure and 
governance that supported the insurgency and circumvented security forces.190  
Rhodesian security forces found it nearly impossible to gather intelligence within these 
isolated areas and struggled to prevent the spread of the revolutionary ideology. 
Through the political commissars, the terrorists would also establish local 
“contactmen,” who facilitated logistics and infiltration of new terrorists into a safe haven 
from neighboring Mozambique.191  The contactmen would also collect intelligence on 
security forces, select safe sites, and serve as the conduit to pass messages between 
different insurgent units throughout the area as well as across the border.  ZANLA 
established a network of underground contacts and auxiliary conduits to slowly and 
quietly cement their ideology within the rural population of Rhodesia, killing any 
indigenous opposition or political opponents.192  Baxter argues that, once the safe havens 
were in place, “Now incoming insurgents were able to simply merge with receptive local 
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populations in the Tribal Trust Lands, the so-called native reserves, and remain 
effectively invisible.”193  Establishing support amongst the local population, therefore, 
was key to ZANLA’s efforts to defeat the small but tactically superior Rhodesian security 
forces.  ZANLA’s overall strategy was to slowly garner massive popular support and 
couple this support with crippling sanctions from western countries to eventually cause 
the political and economic collapse of the white minority regime.194 
Rhodesian security forces were somewhat oblivious to the subversive efforts of 
both ZANLA and ZIPRA until attacks began to take place in northern Rhodesia and local 
populations were unwilling to provide information to security forces.  The Rhodesians 
recognized that the lack of intelligence regarding the insurgents was indicative that the 
“local population was siding with the revolution, hearts and minds were being lost.”195 
C. SELOUS SCOUTS ARE BORN 
The Selous Scouts of Rhodesia were a Special Forces unit primarily composed of 
white Rhodesian NCOs and Officers, who led teams of “turned” African pseudo 
operators during the Rhodesian Bush War.  The Rhodesian government used Selous 
Scouts to penetrate guerrilla safe havens, garner actionable intelligence, and relay the 
information to Rhodesian strike forces.196  These strike forces were typically composed 
of Rhodesian Special Air Service, who had a “fraternal association with the iconic British 
SAS.”197  The compartmented intelligence gathering and strike operations strategy 
provided anonymity to the pseudo operators and limited their chances of compromise to 
the guerrillas.198 
The Selous Scouts charter was to clandestinely eliminate terrorists operating 
inside and outside of Rhodesia.199  The Selous Scouts used the doctrine that Kitson had 
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employed in Kenya and Malaya, but evolved the concept to include conducting lethal 
strikes, which changed the way pseudo operators had historically been employed. Spies 
argues, 
The original techniques employed by the pseudo teams went against the 
guidance Kitson had used in Kenya. The teams attempted to not only gain 
intelligence on insurgents but also kill them. One recurring problem, the 
same problem that Kitson identified, was that pseudo operatives 
compromised themselves when they attempted to conduct offensive 
operations.200 
The newly formed unit drew heavily from the Rhodesian Light Infantry and SAS 
personnel; in particular the unit wanted soldiers with experience as trackers. 
General Peter Walls, Commander of the Rhodesian Army, took a vested interest 
in developing the Selous Scouts because the insurgency was growing and the “war was 
not going well.”201  General Walls tapped Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid Daly to form the 
new unit, convincing him to delay his retirement from the Army.202  LTC Daly 
immediately began to piece together a handpicked staff to form the unit’s headquarters, 
but in his memoirs, Daly writes that there was one important gap he had to fill.  “It was 
clear we had to get men, particularly African men, and we had to get them quickly so we 
could expand and become operational.”203  Rhodesia, being a deeply segregated society, 
had a military that was not much different; the level of training and funding that whites 
received was significantly more than the African soldiers who served in the Rhodesian 
African Rifles.204  LTC Daly decided that the Selous Scouts should receive special 
incentive pay similar to the all-white SAS units. Furthermore, African soldiers who were 
selected to join the Selous Scouts would be entitled to the same benefits as white soldiers, 
essentially doubling the salaries of African soldiers.205  LTC Daly’s recruiting efforts 
paid off not only due to financial incentives, but also because of a new model of equality 
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not witnessed in Rhodesia or even in Africa.  “I wanted to amalgamate the best of 
African customs with the best of the European customs…we’d have a very special sort of 
relationship between the races, of a type, at that time unknown in the Rhodesian 
Army.”206 
LTC Daly developed a grueling physical and mental selection course that was 
designed to weed out men who lacked the stamina for the Selous Scouts’ unique mission.  
LTC Daly kept the unit’s charter completely secret from the trainees for operational 
security, and he led the trainees to believe that they were simply trying out for an elite 
tracker unit.  This belief supported the operational cover the Selous Scouts had 
developed.  After the successful completion of the selection course, LTC Daly held a 
meeting and informed the newest members what their real mission was: 
We have all, I believe, experienced the frustrating difficulties in getting 
information from the local tribesmen who have been subverted by the 
terrorists.  Now you are Africans … imagine the problems that all-
European units, like the Rhodesian Light Infantry, are experiencing.  Now, 
we have discovered a new method of getting information from the 
subverted tribes people [sic] … and you are the men who are going to get 
that information.  You will not become … as you had believed … the 
Army trackers.  Instead, we are going to turn you into terrorists … 
freedom fighters … the boys in the bush … call them what you will … 
and you are going to be far better freedom fighters than the real ones ever 
were. … You will pretend to be ZANLA and ZIPRA terrorists and 
infiltrate the population … and you will try to edge your way into the 
actual terrorist groups themselves.  Now, perhaps you will understand why 
I was only looking for real men.207 
LTC Daly was convinced that the Selous Scouts needed a completely different 
modus operandi than pseudo operations of the past. The Selous Scouts took lessons from 
early experiments conducted in November 1966, where the pseudo groups consisted of 
three to four men who were trained in bush craft but lacked the knowledge and counter 
insurgency experience to be convincing guerrillas.208  Furthermore, the new formation of 
Selous Scouts was inherently different than the operations Kitson led in Malaya, or early 
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Rhodesian experiments, where the “terrorists were tricked into meetings and then 
immediately attacked.”209  LTC Daly writes: “The new role of the Selous Scouts, I 
instructed, would henceforth be to infiltrate the tribal population and the terrorist 
networks, pinpoint the terrorist camps and bases and then direct conventional forces in to 
carry out the actual attacks.”210 
D. “TERRORIZING THE TERRORIST”211 
The Selous Scouts took several measures aimed at avoiding being compromised 
while in action. The Scouts utilized a centralized command and control structure called 
Combined Operations (COMOPS), where the conventional Army and Air Force became 
a supporting effort and force provider to the Selous Scouts, thus providing Special 
Operations Commanders complete operational authority.212  “The Rhodesians launched 
external operations spearheaded to a large extent by its special forces to ‘detect, destroy, 
delay, disrupt and deceive’ terrorists or guerrillas. In the end, Rhodesian special forces 
were the supported rather than a supporting effort.”213  Furthermore, the Selous Scouts 
pseudo operators, in most instances, would relay intelligence information to conventional 
Rhodesian strike forces that would actually attack and destroy guerrilla formations and 
camps rather than the pseudo operators themselves.214  This concept provided anonymity 
to the pseudo operators and limited their chances of compromise to the guerrillas and the 
locals within the terrorist safe havens.215 
The Rhodesian Special Branch, which served as the Rhodesian police and 
intelligence apparatus, also served a significant role in supporting the Selous Scouts and 
their operations.  The Special Branch acted as the lead for “turning” captured terrorist and 
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reintegrating them into the Selous Scouts’ formation.216  The turning of terrorists was an 
extensive process that was critical to the success of the Selous Scouts, because they 
provided invaluable intelligence.  The primary tactic that the Special Branch used was to 
bring formerly turned terrorists into interrogation and begin to establish rapport with the 
detainee and provide extensive medical care for them upon capture.217  This care 
provided comfort to the detainee and demonstrated that his life could improve if he 
switched allegiance to the Rhodesian government.  The alternative option was obviously 
not favorable because the captured terrorists would certainly be tried, convicted, and 
executed for crimes of terrorism. 
Capturing terrorist was imperative to the Selous Scouts not only for intelligence 
gathering on guerrilla bands but as a means to populate the ranks of the pseudo teams.  
Daly and Stiff note,“If a terrorist group was attacked by Fireforce [SAS strike force] and 
all were killed with the exception of one or two prisoners, we could turn those prisoners 
and adopt the groups’ identity, and function as them in an adjacent area sufficiently far 
enough away from any locals who could identify them.”218  Protecting the identities of 
turned terrorist was critical for operational security, but this task was not always 
achieved.  However, the Selous Scouts still found use for the turned terrorist even when 
they had been compromised, by using him as a “rear rank instructor,” providing 
information on “contactmen” and guerrilla bands in other areas.219  According to Daly 
and Stiff, “We once had one man for example … a Detachment Commander … who 
although utterly compromised, still assisted positively in the capture of forty-six terrorists 
within a space of two weeks.”220 
The deep infiltration of the guerrilla network by the Selous Scouts provided 
targeting information for the strike forces and also sowed distrust amongst the guerrilla 
groups and caused the groups to target each other out of fear that they were actually 
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Selous Scouts.  A captured terrorist “reported having been involved in ten firefights since 
infiltration into Rhodesia, but on checking his story out, we found only two had been 
with Rhodesian Security Forces…the rest had been with other ZANLA terrorist 
groups.”221 
The Selous Scouts had to constantly assess and develop their tactics because the 
ZANLA/ZIPRA terrorists became aware of the pseudo tactic and would plan ambushes 
against the operators.  Through the political commissars, the terrorists would establish 
local contactmen who would facilitate the logistics and infiltration of new terrorists into a 
safe haven from neighboring Mozambique.222  The contactmen would also collect 
intelligence on security forces, select safe sites, and serve as the conduit to pass messages 
between different terror groups throughout the area as well as across the border. 
The Selous Scouts recognized the importance of the contactmen and began to 
establish their own pseudo contactmen within operational areas to destabilize the 
situation and confuse the terrorists as to who they could truly trust. “Groups entering 
Rhodesia for the first time, found great difficulty in linking up with terrorist groups 
already operating in the areas to which they had been allotted.  They became badly 
dispirited and demoralised [sic], particularly after being savagely attacked by other 
terrorists who were under the impression they were Selous Scouts.”223 
The pseudo operations employed by the Selous Scouts were not without criticism.  
In August 1976, the Selous Scouts conducted a cross border raid into Mozambique killing 
over 1,000 ZANLA guerrillas inside a camp that was registered as a United Nations 
refugee camp.224  Codenamed “Operation Eland,” the attack on the Nyadzonya Camp, 
which served as a logistics and training base for ZANLA terrorists, was conducted with 
remarkable stealth and precision.225  The Selous Scouts disguised themselves and their 
convoy of vehicles as a Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) convoy, a communist 
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group fighting to liberate Mozambique from Portuguese rule.226  The FRELIMO were 
actively supporting ZANLA combatants in Mozambique and both had established a base 
in Nyadzonya, which served as a training base for thousands of ZANLA guerrillas.  The 
disguised Selous Scouts literally drove their convoy of pseudo operators through the front 
gate of the camp without being stopped by the unsuspecting guards.227  “This vast human 
phalanx began to move forward and soon the vehicles were mobbed by cheering, 
ululating people.  Clearly the population of the camp had no inkling whatsoever that this 
was a trap.”228  A few moments later gunfire erupted and the Selous Scouts gunned down 
1,028 ZANLA terrorists in the middle of the parade field of the camp.229  Captured 
ZANLA documents in later operations revealed that 3,610 ZANLA members were 
wounded during the attack.230  The Selous Scouts suffered five wounded and no 
casualties during the conduct of Operation Eland.231  LTC Daly asserts that “the raid on 
the Nyadzonya/Pungwe base was, to my mind, the classic operation of the whole war … 
carried out by only seventy two soldiers … without air support … and without a reserve 
of any kind.”232 
The large body count and successful cross border operations that the Selous 
Scouts conducted proved to be militarily effective but had negative political impact for 
the Rhodesian government. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) labeled the Nyadzonya base as a refugee camp in May 1976, three months 
prior to Operation Eland.233  LTC Daly asserts that every UNHCR inspection of reported 
ZANLA and ZIPRA camps were coordinated well in advance to provide the appearance 
to inspectors that the guerrilla camp was indeed a refugee camp rather than a terrorist 
training base.  “Needless to say, on those visits the camps would be full of old folk, 
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women and children, the closest thing to a firearm seen would be a plough shear.”234  An 
official ZANLA report captured on November 23, 1977 directly refutes the claims that 
the Nyadzonya base was a refugee camp; rather, the report unequivocally indicates that 
the base was a major terrorist training camp.235 
Furthermore, ZANLA later facilitated an investigation by the UNHCR, which 
concluded that the attack on Nyadzonya was an atrocity committed against refugees who 
were living in a camp receiving United Nations aid.236  The raid at Nyadzonya was 
tactically a remarkable success, but strategically the raid enabled the international 
community to denounce Rhodesia and isolate them further, precipitating negotiations to 
end the war. 
In April 1979 the Rhodesian government and the black majority agreed to have 
new elections in order to facilitate the peace process in the war-ravaged country, resulting 
in the election of the first Black Prime Minister, Bishop Abel Muzzorewa.237  By 
December 28, 1979 a ceasefire was declared between Rhodesian security forces and the 
guerrillas, supervised by a British governor who “assumed authority over the colony in 
order to represent a return to legality and to preside over the transition to majority 
rule.”238  Following the ceasefire a British Commonwealth force of 1,300 troops arrived 
in Rhodesia to assist in facilitating the peace process and supervised the consolidation of 
15,370 guerrillas into “Assembly Points” by January 6, 1980.239  Both guerrillas and 
Rhodesian security forces violated the ceasefire agreement on numerous occasions to 
include multiple failed assassination attempts on ZANU leader Robert Mugabe by 
suspected Selous Scouts.240  Mugabe survived every attempt on his life and eventually 
won the 1980 Presidential election in a landslide.  “As voting ended on 3 March it was 
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estimated that some 93 per cent [SIC] of eligible voters had cast a ballot.  Sixty-three per 
cent [SIC] of those voted for Mugabe and his ZANU party.”241  Following the election of 
Mugabe, the Rhodesian military was formally dissolved and every unit with the 
exception of the Selous Scouts received some form of ceremonial disbandment.242 
E. STRENGTHS AND LIMITS OF PSEUDO OPERATIONS 
Gaining access to the demographic safe havens of ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas 
was a significant problem for Rhodesian security forces.  Accessing the demographic 
sanctuaries in Rhodesia, therefore, became paramount for the government to counter not 
only the guerrillas but also the pervasive ideology that was sweeping through the rural 
African tribes.  The Rhodesians realized that they needed to access the denied areas and 
the African tribal population; the Selous Scouts were the solution.  The pseudo operators 
of the Selous Scouts provided the Rhodesians with a strategy to access demographically 
denied areas to develop intelligence, direct strike operations, and disrupt the terrorist 
network from within. 
Another important lesson learned in the Rhodesian war was that indigenous 
populations have unparalleled importance in assisting terrorist groups to develop safe 
havens.  Tribal and ethnic ties compound the problem and provide terror groups the 
opportunity to freely operate, recruit, and train within geographic and demographic safe 
havens.  The level of subversion that terror groups achieve within the safe haven is 
indicative of the influence terror groups have exerted over the local population.243  
Gathering intelligence regarding terror networks within the safe haven becomes nearly 
impossible when the terrorist have developed complete control over the population and 
locals become very unlikely to provide information to security forces.244  Pseudo 
operations are arguably the best tactic to access these denied areas.  Pseudo operations 
provide an avenue to effectively target terrorist groups when the population is adamantly 
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sympathetic to the insurgency.  Pseudo operations may be the initial strategy to gather 
intelligence and degrade terrorist safe havens, but the host nation government will 
eventually have to make inroads with the local population to achieve a lasting peace. 
Third, the value of preserving a pseudo group’s operational cover cannot be 
overstated because of the time and training needed to develop effective operators. 
Although the Rhodesians found effective uses for compromised operators, the strategic 
utility of a pseudo group that is compromised could jeopardize the use of the groups in 
the future. Widespread compromise could limit pseudo operators’ ability to have success 
in deeply penetrating terrorist networks.  However, employing pseudo operators in a 
direct action role can be beneficial in targeting the network and maintaining a light 
footprint within a safe haven, where employing overt strike forces will cause political 
backlash or further foment negative popular sentiment. 
Finally, a war of attrition strategy must be coupled with a robust population 
centric effort aimed to counter the insurgency’s pervasive ideology.  In Rhodesia, 
ZANLA and ZIPRA terrorists methodically infiltrated villages and subverted the 
populace by establishing political commissars to establish a foothold amongst the 
indigenous population.  The commissars would set up camps within local villages and 
would appeal to the tribesman with a clever nationalist ideology and revolutionary 
rhetoric, garnering popular support within the ungoverned bush territories.245  The 
popular support that was established within these geographically isolated areas also 
became demographic safe havens for the guerrillas, where only native tribesman and 
locally recruited guerrillas could operate.  The white minority Rhodesian government did 
little to win over the indigenous tribes and instead simply targeted them with kinetic 
strikes. 
Rhodesian security forces found it nearly impossible to gather intelligence within 
these isolated areas and struggled to prevent the spread of the revolutionary ideology 
until the development of the Selous Scouts and the pseudo tactic.  Although the Selous 
Scouts were extremely effective at targeting and killing ZANLA and ZIPRA terrorists, 
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the Rhodesian government never achieved popular support to counter the spread of the 
insurgency.  “Until the very end of the war, ‘body counts’ and ‘kill ratios’ continued to 
preoccupy Rhodesian officers and public opinion.  They had learned little from the 
American experience in Vietnam.”246  Although the attrition strategy was tactically 
successful, it could not be implemented indefinitely while the Rhodesian government 
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VI. SONS OF IRAQ 
Incentivizing key stakeholders while also threatening those who are not 
supportive of military operations abroad is a strategy that the United States has employed 
in the past.  As described in chapter two, the strategy seeks to create an inhospitable place 
for terrorists where the local population and indigenous security forces directly and 
indirectly counter terrorist groups, mitigating the need for occupying forces to actively 
provide security for the area.  At the root of the strategy is securing the support of the 
population; without popular support neither the terrorist nor the counter-terrorist can be 
successful. Political scientist Austin Long describes this form of patronage as “when an 
external power becomes involved in the provision of internal security to a state. This 
presents the possibility of a three-way relationship among tribe, state and external power 
that can produce many complications.”247 
The strategy of co-opting surrogate security forces has been implemented at the 
micro-level to secure population centers and at the state level to maintain peace. 
“American forces employed variants of surrogate warfare from their frontier battles in the 
Western plains, the Philippine insurrection, the Nicaraguan incursions, and the Vietnam 
War. The Iraq War, however, re-catalyzed interest in COIN techniques and in the usage 
of host-country manpower.”248  In particular, this indirect approach to countering 
terrorist safe havens can take on two different forms: defensive and offensive.249  The 
defensive approach is one where U.S. forces are working in concert with indigenous 
security forces to not only counter threats to the government, but also improve upon the 
underlying grievances that may have caused the insurgency.250  The offensive form of 
this approach, according to political scientist Thomas Henriksen, “is far easier to execute 
than its defensive counterpart. It usually translates into a more limited and briefer 
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military, political, and economic presence by U.S. armed forces.”251  The offensive form 
was witnessed during the 1980’s when the U.S. supported the mujahedeen against the 
Soviet Union, the contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s and 1990s, and again in 2001 when a 
limited number of U.S. Special Forces (USSF) supported the Northern Alliance in 
overthrowing the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda’s safe haven.252 
A more recent example of this strategy is U.S. forces’ financing, supplying and 
training of the Sons of Iraq in Al Anbar province, Iraq, where Al Qaeda in Iraq had 
established a safe haven.  Al Anbar province, in western Iraq, is a Sunni dominated 
region that enjoyed power and influence during the reign of Saddam Hussein and quickly 
became disenfranchised after the U.S. led invasion and expulsion of the regime.  
Exploiting newly found grievances, AQI established roots within the restive province and 
used the tribally governed space as a safe haven to recruit, train, and launch terrorist 
attacks. 
This chapter analyzes the development of an AQI safe haven within Al Anbar 
Province, and the insurgency that led Iraqi society to the brink of civil war in the midst of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  This chapter will illuminate the advantages and disadvantages 
of co-opting surrogate security forces akin to the SOI, and illustrate the viability of the 
strategy to disrupt or defeat terrorist safe havens. 
A. SUNNIS IN IRAQ’S ANBAR PROVINCE 
Iraq is a diverse country that is composed primarily of three different groups of 
people; Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and the Kurds, who are also Sunni.  The Sunni Arab 
minority in Iraq is primarily dispersed throughout the western and northern provinces of 
Al Anbar, Salah Ad Din, and Ninawa. The Kurds predominately populate the northern 
provinces of Arbil, Dahuk, Kirkuk, and parts of Ninawa.  The Shia majority dominates 
southern Iraq in the provinces of Basra, Najaf, Wasit, and Maysan.  The capital, Baghdad, 
is a diverse metropolis where Sunni and Shia amalgamate and where the Shia dominated 
central government sits. 
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The former regime led by Saddam Hussein, along with his Baath party, was 
disproportionately Sunni Arab and favored the sect in every aspect of governance.  In 
addition to favoring Sunnis, the Baath party made extensive efforts to minimize tribal 
influence on governmental affairs through land appropriation reforms that separated the 
agrarian population from the sheikhs that controlled them.253  Although the Baath party 
adamantly wanted to change the power structure of Iraq, the tribes influenced Saddam 
Hussein significantly, and he overwhelmingly appointed members of his own Albu Nasir 
tribe to key government positions.254  This strategy allowed Saddam to maintain his 
authoritarian rule without having to use military forces in rural areas.255  He showered 
specific tribal leaderships with money, weapons, and land, further legitimizing the tribal 
chieftains prominence to maintain their loyalty.256 
The United States toppled the Sunni-dominated regime following the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. Sunni tribal sheikhs lost significant influence due to their 
prominent roles in the Ba’ath Party.257  This loss of power significantly impacted the 
security situation; Sunni men not only resented the U.S. occupation, they were adamantly 
opposed to the fledgling Shia dominated Iraqi government, resisting both with violence. 
From the lens of Long’s ‘Tribal-State Security Relations’ model, described in 
chapter two, Saddam Hussein used a combination of state and auxiliary tribalism to 
maintain control of Iraq.258  State-tribalism “occurs when one group seeks to dominate 
the state’s security apparatus by commingling tribal networks with the formal state 
structure.”259  Saddam Hussein asserted this form of tribalism by appointing his fellow 
tribesmen into positions of power within the state’s security forces.  Long argues that, 
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due to extensive military losses from the Iraq-Iran war, coupled with the degradation of 
state wealth and social programs, Saddam was compelled to have a greater reliance on 
loyal tribes to maintain influence and security throughout Iraq.260  Saddam even went so 
far as to embrace full auxiliary tribalism in areas where tribal sheikhs developed their 
own private armies and tribal customs governed the area.261 
This delegation of power to tribal authorities not only granted them formal 
authority but also enhanced their ability to seek extra-legal sources of 
additional revenue from smuggling (particularly lucrative as Iraq was 
under United Nations sanctions), government corruption and kickbacks, 
and even outright extortion and hijacking.262 
Thus, the Sunni tribes of Al Anbar enjoyed prestige and, perhaps more importantly, 
financial benefits from this autonomy, which quickly came to an end with the U.S. led 
invasion in 2003. 
The U.S. policy of de-ba’athification, in particular, hit Sunni tribes the hardest, 
alienated once powerful tribes, and enabled conditions for terrorists to exploit the divide 
between Sunni tribes, U.S. forces, and a fledgling Iraqi government led by Shias. “An 
order to de-Ba’athify[sic] Iraqi society was the first major official act of Ambassador L. 
Paul Bremer upon his arrival in that country to assume control of the newly created 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).”263  This order effectively targeted the top four 
layers of leadership of the former government, created a rewards system for information 
leading to the capture of former Ba’ath leaders and also banned future government 
employment of former Ba’ath members.264 
Shortly after the first order directing de-ba’athification, Bremer issued CPA Order 
2 on May 23, 2003, dissolving the Iraqi military and intelligence services.265  De-
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ba’athification and disbanding the Iraqi military affected an estimated 50,000 people.266  
Members of the Ba’ath party were all treated as threats to the future of Iraq and these 
directives affected a significant portion of the Sunni minority, all of whom sought jobs 
within the government sector that required Ba’ath membership.267  W. Andrew Terrill 
argues that this broad sweeping policy against the Ba’ath party appeared to the Sunni 
minority as a “de-sunnization” intended to empower the newly minted Shia led 
government in Baghdad.268 
Terrill further contends that the CPA decisions regarding de-Ba’athification and 
disbanding the military were “the building blocks of the insurgency and provided it with 
the organizational capacity to create that insurgency.”269  These policies therefore helped 
set the stage for a demographic safe haven among the disenfranchised Sunnis for the 
newly emerging Al Qaeda in Iraq. 
B. THE RISE OF AL QAEDA IN IRAQ 
The Sunni tribes of Al Anbar province were an essential demographic among 
which AQI could coalesce and establish a terrorist safe haven. From this demographic 
strong hold, AQI could then wage jihad against an occupying U.S. military and Shia 
dominated government.  Moreover, Al Anbar’s expansive desert, long porous border with 
Syria, and natural ratline of the Euphrates River Valley served as an exceptional 
geographic safe haven.  Jordanian born jihadist and AQI leader, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi 
stated, “the rise of the Al-Qaida in Mesopotamia Organization was built on the shoulders 
of the Sunnis in Iraq…it is thanks to the Sunni tribesman that the Organization [i.e., Al-
Qaida] owes its existence.”270 
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Prior to the invasion in 2003, Al Qaeda central, based in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, had few, if any, operatives in Iraq.271  According to Cigar, at the core of Al-
Zarqawi’s strategy to garner Iraqi support, was the plan to drive a wedge between tribal 
loyalties and his recruits by attracting new members through their Islamic faith.272 
Recognizing the importance of the Sunni tribes within Al Anbar province, AQI 
sought to sow a deeper resentment between the tribes, central government, and U.S. 
military to sway support of the populace and cement AQI’s demographic safe haven. The 
initial safe haven that Zarqawi and AQI carved out was within the city of Fallujah, which 
served as a magnet for Iraqi and foreign jihadist in 2004.  U.S. Marines destroyed this 
safe haven when they all but demolished the city during Operation Al Fajr (New Dawn) 
in November 2004.273 
With the loss of Fallujah as a sanctuary, AQI sought to regroup in the city of Al 
Qaim along the border with Syria.  Seeking refuge in Al Qaim provided AQI with a 
“lucrative smuggling route for black market goods, and was AQI’s lifeline to Baghdad as 
foreign fighters, money, and other resources that fueled the insurgency infiltrated 
Iraq.”274  The tribes of Al Qaim welcomed AQI terrorists with the viewpoint they were 
assisting fellow Muslims in the defense of Iraq from foreign invaders.275  AQI offered to 
partner with tribes in the area to expel U.S. forces and also garnered support by 
promising money and jihad to preserve tribal honor and their religion.276  As Michael 
Innes notes, “terrorist space depends on collusion with its host society, terrorism like 
piracy is a complex system dependent for its functioning on mutually supportive 
arrangements between agents and abettors.”277 
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Cigar notes that the human terrain of Al Anbar was critical to AQI in their 
operations but ultimately AQI’s ideology and unrealistic policies would backfire.278  AQI 
quickly pursued policies for the local populace that were grounded in an extreme 
interpretation of shari’a law and exercised broad authority over the tribal society using 
religion as justification for brutal acts of murder.279  AQI exploited Sunnis in Al Anbar 
for their gain by skimming profits from prevalent smuggling operations that the tribal 
chiefs enjoyed prior to their arrival. Long argues: “perhaps most importantly, al-Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia [AQI] was competing for control of revenue sources—such as banditry and 
smuggling—that had long been the province of the tribes.”280  AQI also tried to 
strengthen ties with the tribes through forced marriages between women of Al Qaim to 
AQI fighters.281  Cigar claims: “Al-Qaida increasingly appeared to threaten the tribal 
shaykhs’ autonomy and authority by its control over local economic activity and by its 
intrusive presence in all social interactions, the levers on which tribal shaykhs relied to 
affect their power.”282 
In addition to these tactics, AQI engaged in acts of barbarism that turned the 
population against the organization. In May 2005, the police chief of the town Husaybah, 
in the Al Qaim district, was shot and beheaded in the street by AQI terrorists.283  This 
brutal terrorist act mobilized the Albu-Mahal tribe to initiate an uprising against AQI.284  
That same year, the Albu-Mahal tribe conducted an offensive against AQI in the town of 
Husaybah and devastated their presence.  After clearing Husbayah of terrorists, the tribe 
“began reconstructing damaged sections of the city and established tribal security around  
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critical infrastructure such as government buildings and services.”285  The success of the 
tribe, however, was short lived. AQI counter-attacked by recruiting thousands of fighters 
from other areas to assault the powerful tribe.286 
In late July 2005, the tribe reached out to the U.S. Marines for help because 
thousands of AQI fighters, led by Al-Zarqawi, had amassed in the Al Qaim district to 
destroy the Albu-Mahal tribe.287  Albu-Mahal’s overture presented another seam that 
U.S. forces could exploit between AQI and the population.  The alliance of tribesmen and 
U.S. forces would not come to fruition until October 2005, when the Marines and United 
States Army Special Forces partnered with members of the Albu-Mahal tribe to launch 
Operation Iron Fist and Operation Steel Curtain to retake the Al Qaim district.288  By late 
November the Marines, USSF, and tribesmen had retaken the district and occupied key 
areas with Iraqi security forces to prevent a resurgence of AQI.289  In essence, U.S. 
forces had created a “Circle of Trust” with the Albu-Mahal tribe that included the mayor, 
Iraqi security forces, and coalition forces, but at the center of this partnership was the 
sheikh of the tribe.290 
This newfound partnership between U.S. forces and the Albu-Mahal tribe was in 
sharp contrast to CPA officials who felt that tribal authority was out of date and would 
only hold back the country from its new democratic destiny.291  A strategic change in 
policy did not gain traction until late in 2006, when the country was engulfed in a 
complex and robust insurgency.292  William Knarr argues: “AQI gave the Coalition and 
GOI [Government of Iraq] an opportunity to change the balance in their favor and under 
their terms.”293 
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C. THE CREATION OF THE SONS OF IRAQ 
The development of the SOI was initially slow, due in part to the CPA’s 
resistance to empowering tribal leaders and, in part, to skepticism amongst the tribes. 
Cigar notes: “The tribes had limited interest- or in some cases downright hostility- for the 
United States’ original declared policy objectives of promoting democracy, a market 
economy, human rights, women’s equality, and establishing relations with Israel.”294  
Cigar further asserts that although the tribes lacked common ground regarding strategic 
U.S. objectives, they shared a common disdain for AQI, which was ransacking Iraqi 
society.295  The relationship between U.S. forces and the SOI matured over time and 
became official in “September 2006, when a number of shaykhs willing to commit their 
tribes to cooperation with the United States in the fight against Al-Qaida went public.”296 
The success of the SOI in Al Qaim spread throughout Al Anbar province; tribal 
sheikhs and U.S. money developed militias and combat power when needed. Ultimately, 
the tentative partnership between U.S. forces and Sunni tribal sheikhs became known as 
the “Awakening, or Al Sahawa.”297  Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who coined the 
term, led a “lower-tier” tribe in Ramadi that joined with the Albu-Mahal tribe of Al Qaim 
to fight AQI in 2006.298  By March 2008, just two short years after the first emergence of 
SOI militia, there were 91,000 thousand tribesmen serving in the militia throughout the 
Sunni areas of Iraq and over 24,000 had joined the police of Al Anbar province.299 
Notably, USSF also partnered with the local tribesmen to counter the expansion 
of AQI as early as February 2004. A USSF Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) 555, 
contacted members of the Albu Nimr tribe, who lived near the town of Hit in Al 
Anbar.300  The ODA initially developed a relationship with low-level tribesmen and 
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infused money and civil affairs projects into the district, knowing that this would 
persuade tribal sheikhs to meet with the ODA.301  This approach was different than the 
relationship that was developed by the Marines in Al Qaim; the tribe was not seeking 
U.S. support out of fear of being decimated by AQI in Hit, but rather was hoping to 
prosper from the partnership.  Subsequent ODAs fostered and maintained this 
relationship. 
In October 2005, ODA 545 worked to establish the tribal militia as a scout 
element for operations and called them “Desert Protectors.”302  The ODA developed a 
30-day training program for the tribesmen in Fallujah, aimed at training 200 members but 
only 30 actually attended formal training.303  This training and employment of the 
militia, although small, was successful and the ODA partnered with the Desert Protectors 
to counter the threats of AQI in Hit. 
Other ODAs similarly worked with Iraqi security forces like the Police and Army 
to employ Anbari tribesmen against AQI.  The development of the SOI was distinctly 
different in each area of Al Anbar because there was not a blueprint for how to 
implement the strategy.  Every tribe was seemingly different, just like every ODA or 
Marine unit with a different modus operandi.  Major Brent Lindeman, a USSF ODA 
commander in Hit notes: “The Awakening movements in Al Qaim, Baghdadi, Hit, and 
Ramadi were not independent events, and yet the ways the Awakening manifested itself 
in these locations differed a great deal.”304  The one consistent factor across the strategy 
was that it required a willing and able tribe to participate in the effort. 
The success in Al Anbar was replicated throughout Sunni areas of Iraq and U.S. 
forces began to funnel money to the militias, paying recruits, and even went so far as to 
provide personal security against AQI for a number of tribal sheikhs who controlled the 
militias, including helicopter air support.305  This support not only bolstered the ranks of 
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the SOI militia, but it emboldened the tribal sheikhs who had lost their sense of status 
after the collapse of the regime.  Following the Awakening, tribal leaders were directing 
their kinsman to not only denounce AQI, but to actively fight them along with U.S. forces 
that had previously been seen as the enemy. 
The SOI strategy was remarkably successful but uneven as certain areas took 
longer to secure than others; this rate of progress can be attributed to multiple factors, 
including the geography of Anbar, enemy strength, resources of the tribes, and most 
importantly, the willingness of the tribe to shoulder the effort. Cigar acknowledges the 
overall success of the SOI by noting: “Monthly attack levels in Al-Anbar had declined 
from 1,350 in October 2006 to slightly over 200 in August 2007…by summer 2007, Al-
Anbar had been largely secured.”306 
D. STRENGTHS AND LIMITS OF THE SURROGATE APPROACH 
Several factors contributed to the success of the SOI program. First, without 
securing the support of local leadership the strategy would have failed.  Through the SOI, 
the sheikhs in Anbar could enjoy their renewed sense of authority, but more importantly 
they regained their financial windfall from their new alliance with the United States.  For 
example, reconstruction projects were growing at an astronomical rate due to the new 
security environment and, by May 2009, U.S forces spent $1.8 billion in Al Anbar 
alone.307 
Second, U.S.-instigated strengthening of tribal leaders and their followers greatly 
assisted in countering AQI. A unified tribal effort hindered AQI recruitment efforts 
throughout the province, to the point that AQI sought to create its own “pro Al-Qaida 
tribally based forces.”308  The counter-Sahawa attempt was not designed to supplant the 
current SOI, but rather provide a counter-balance militia that would protect AQI 
operatives and be sympathetic to their jihadist ideology. Cigar notes that although this  
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AQI initiative was unrealistic, “what it does underscore is Al-Qaida’s acceptance of the 
reality of the continuity and strength of tribal cohesion and of the necessity of 
accommodating it.”309 
However this consolidation and preferential treatment also came at a cost of 
greater instability between tribes.310  An Anbar Sheikh named Ali Hatim argued that 
Sheikh Sattar, in particular, had become too powerful and received preferential treatment 
from U.S. forces.311  In fact, U.S. forces inadvertently disrupted the tribal status quo by 
empowering some sheikhs who may have not risen to prominence in the absence of the 
U.S. occupation. 
Third, the Awakening and SOI program forced AQI to create a new anti-tribal 
narrative.  AQI leadership scolded tribal leaders in communiqués claiming that anti-Al 
Qaeda sheikhs were apostates and leading mercenaries against Islam.312  AQI felt a 
significant threat to the survival of their organization due to the SOI, and blamed the U.S. 
success on the allure of money that the tribes received.313  Cigar notes: “Al-Qaida, of 
course, fought back as best it could in what now had become a deperate [sic] contest for 
survival in a hostile environment.”314  Even Osama Bin Laden sought to change the 
narrative in Iraq, albeit by taking a different tone than the AQI leadership, by appealing 
to the tribal leaders to maintain their allegiance to the jihad.315  Bin Laden made a 
concerted effort to appeal to the tribes in 2007, “speaking to them as ‘our beloved 
awesome tribes,’ promising that they would be rewarded on Judgment Day if they 
remained loyal.”316 
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Along similar lines, AQI was forced to adapt their strategy to try to counter SOI.  
Following the death of AQI’s leader Abu Musab Al Zarqawi in 2006, AQI instilled a new 
leader, an Iraqi named Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi, who would lead the rebranded Islamic 
State of Iraq (ISI).317  This rebranding provided an inherently Iraqi face on the 
organization that would be more inclusive of the tribes and prevent the egregious 
offenses that Zarqawi directed against the locals.  Even with the rebranding and new Iraqi 
leadership, AQI struggled to maintain influence and operational effectiveness as long as 
the SOI were intact, evidenced by the fact that entire Iraqi AQI units switched allegiance 
and joined the SOI as a means of survival rather than personal sentiment.318 
Fourth, the Awakening successfully turned the population against AQI through a 
tribal uprising that rallied the Sunnis to not only reject AQI’s extremist ideology, but also 
partner with U.S. forces to secure their towns. The new reality on the ground in Iraq after 
the SOI was one where AQI lost the support of the populous and as a result lost their safe 
haven from which they thrived. U.S. forces provided necessary combat power and money 
to create a safe space for the tribes to regain control of their towns within Al Anbar 
without the repression of AQI operating from a sanctuary. The development of local 
security forces composed of local tribal members, backed by the coalition, provided a 
positive perception to the population of U.S. forces and countered the narrative painted 
by AQI.  The SOI concept also created jobs for unemployed Sunnis who previously had 
no other options besides joining the insurgency that paid for attacks against U.S. and Iraqi 
forces. After failing to rally the population to their side, AQI units fled east to Samarra 
because the environment had become so inhospitable to the group.319  The success of the 
SOI in Al Qaim spread to other areas beyond Al Anbar province, including other Sunni 
dominated cities like Tikrit, which had been insurgent hotbeds. Overall, this strategy 
created an environment that not only provided jobs and security, but also re-legitimized 
tribal leaders who lost power after de-ba’athification, all of which gained the support of 
the people. The fledgling central government lacked the ability to govern outside of 
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Baghdad and provide essential services to the population.  The SOI were able to fill this 
void, which inherently resulted in a more stable security environment. 
Fifth, the SOI experience shows that co-opting surrogate security forces must be 
carefully implemented and the selection criteria for the supported local authorities must 
be stringent and the leadership vetted.  In order to determine whom to support, one must 
acquire a vast amount of intelligence regarding that individual or group that the strategy 
targets, prior to moving forward with support.  Simply paying and arming local militias 
may exacerbate the safe haven if the supported force is actually playing both sides of the 
conflict and simply acting as an opportunist. 
Furthermore, and most importantly as witnessed in Iraq today, support must 
continue until the central government of that country can support the effort itself, or the 
strategy runs the risk of losing the fragile gains made. The strategy of employing 
surrogate security forces proved effective in the near term at denying AQI a sanctuary, 
but the prospects of long-term success require steadfast commitment from a foreign 
power, the local government, or both. Since the U.S withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, 
terrorist attacks have seen a resurgence that has not been witnessed since the height of 
AQI in 2007. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
More than a decade after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. leadership continues to place a 
high priority on pursuing terrorists and denying the areas that provide sanctuary. 
However, evidence suggests that the United States’ current emphasis on counterterrorism 
and irregular warfare may not be having the desired effect of eradicating terrorism.  Most 
notably, Al Qaeda still exists, despite destroying their safe haven in Afghanistan in 2001 
and killing Osama bin Laden in 2011, and the Al Qaeda phenomenon has spread to Iraq, 
the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa and the Horn of Africa.  The persistence and growth 
of Al Qaeda suggests that a new approach is needed regarding safe havens and targeting 
leadership. 
According to the President of the United States in the 2010 U.S. National Security 
Strategy, the U.S. will “Deny Safe Havens and Strengthen At-Risk States: Wherever al-
Qa’ida or its terrorist affiliates attempt to establish a safe haven—as they have in Yemen, 
Somalia, the Maghreb, and the Sahel—we will meet them with growing pressure.”320  
Given the task of denying terrorist safe havens, a complex question remains for USSOF: 
What strategy should USSOF use to counter terrorist safe havens? 
This thesis has sought to answer this question by, first, elucidating the often 
ambiguous definition of terrorist safe havens, and highlighting the importance of an often 
overlooked variable of terrorist safe havens—demographics.  The thesis then has 
analyzed the concept, strengths, and weaknesses of four distinct counterterrorist safe 
haven strategies, based on a comparison of historical case studies, in an effort to assess 
the validity of possible strategies for the United States and USSOF in particular. 
First, this thesis looked at a decapitation strategy within safe havens by 
investigating the conditions that led up to the 1992 capture of Abimael Guzman Reynoso, 
the leader of the Shining Path in Peru, and the effects of the Peruvian forces in combating 
Shining Path insurgents and their safe haven.  Second, this thesis analyzed a tactical 
containment strategy for a safe haven, along with the capture of key leaders, as presented 
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by the Battle of Algiers between French and Arab insurgents.  Third, this thesis analyzed 
a pseudo operations strategy, focusing on the Selous Scouts of Rhodesia, and analyzed 
the implementation of pseudo operations during the Rhodesian Civil War to counter two 
communist insurgencies and their demographic safe havens. Finally, this thesis 
investigated the strategy of co-opting surrogate security forces through the case of the 
Sons of Iraq within Anbar Province, Iraq, during the U.S led war. This case highlighted 
the successes and failures of surrogates providing security in ungoverned spaces.   
A. KEY FINDINGS 
As seen in the case of the Shining Path, some key variables needed to exist for a 
decapitation strategy within a safe haven to be successful. Ultimately, the actions of the 
Shining Path itself led to the loss of popular support and their safe haven within the rural 
areas of Peru.  This presented an opportunity for the Peruvian government to implement a 
counterinsurgency strategy that not only addressed grievances of the population, but also 
provided much needed intelligence, which in turn enabled leadership targeting and the 
capture of Guzman and key lieutenants.  Garnering popular support of the indigenous 
population proved to be a critical precursor to Peru’s decapitation strategy because it 
provided the government with invaluable intelligence that enabled strikes to degrade the 
terrorist network. 
However, President Fujimori’s strategy came at a cost to the democracy of Peru 
when he dissolved Congress in April 1992, and assumed a dictatorial role in governing 
the country.321  Fujimori’s decree provided him the authority to employ and direct the 
GEIN—special counterterrorism forces—where he saw fit in order to defeat the Shining 
Path.  This singular ownership enabled the government to trample on the rights of 
Peruvian citizens, leading to atrocities and rampant corruption by both the government 
and military. These transgressions caused significant fissures in Peruvian society until 
new elections brought about reconciliation. 
A containment strategy aims to quarantine the threat and then dismantle terrorist 
groups from within a specific area. Realizing the Casbah provided a natural safe haven 
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for the FLN to recruit, train and educate their support base, the French sought to cut off 
the insurgency from the rest of its surroundings. Instituting a curfew and conducting 
military patrols in and around the Casbah allowed the French to quarantine and 
completely isolated the FLN within their safe haven. The containment of the Casbah put 
the French on the offensive and allowed them to determine the time and place of 
engagement.  The strategy further permitted the paratroopers to mitigate the risk to 
French forces, based on improved intelligence, as well as minimize friendly and civilian 
casualties through a more targeted approach against FLN leadership, rather than through 
chance contact.  
Although the containment strategy was tactically successful at pacifying the 
violence in Algiers in the near term, the French government eventually lost the support of 
its own people for a colonial occupation, ceding power to the Algerians.  The lynchpin of 
enduring success again rested with the population, and the French government could not 
indefinitely contain the Algerian people. 
The third strategy analyzed in this thesis was pseudo operations, which “indicates 
the use of organized teams which are disguised as guerrilla groups for the long- or short-
term penetration of insurgent controlled areas.”322  As described in Chapter VI, pseudo 
operators have been used to infiltrate terrorist safe havens and networks to garner 
actionable intelligence, conduct strikes, and sow distrust amongst terror groups. This 
strategy focuses on undermining a network from within and destroying the group’s 
operational capacity.  Pseudo teams, comprised of “turned” insurgents who have been 
extensively vetted, provide a deep penetration strategy that is extremely useful for 
effectively targeting terrorist groups in safe havens.  Pseudo operations are arguably the 
most effective strategy for countering a demographic safe haven, but the strategy is also 
the most complex to implement and sustain. 
In the case of Rhodesia, gaining access to the demographic safe havens of 
ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas was a significant problem for Rhodesian security forces.  
Accessing the demographic sanctuaries in Rhodesia, therefore, became paramount for the 
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government to counter not only the guerrillas, but also the pervasive ideology that was 
sweeping through the rural African tribes.  The Rhodesians realized that they needed to 
access the denied areas and the African tribal population; the Selous Scouts were the 
solution.  The pseudo operators of the Selous Scouts provided the Rhodesians with a 
strategy to access demographically denied areas to help develop intelligence, direct strike 
operations, and disrupt the terrorist network from within. 
The biggest strength of the pseudo operations strategy in Rhodesia was the Selous 
Scouts’ ability to gather actionable intelligence on ZANLA and ZIPRA insurgents, which 
was completely absent prior to the implementation of the strategy.  The combat 
effectiveness and lethality of the Selous Scouts was remarkable and devastating to the 
terrorist networks within and outside of Rhodesia.  However, even though the strategy 
was extremely effective at targeting and killing ZANLA and ZIPRA terrorists, the 
Rhodesian government never achieved popular African tribal support to counter the 
spread of the insurgency.  The most significant weakness of the Rhodesian pseudo 
operations strategy was not with the pseudo operations concept, but rather the 
government’s insistence on attriting insurgents rather than engaging the population.  This 
approach was tactically successful, but could not be implemented indefinitely while the 
Rhodesian government suffered sanctions and widespread disapproval from super powers 
like the United States. 
The final strategy examined in this study was of co-opting surrogates.  This 
strategy seeks to create an inhospitable place for terrorists by helping the local population 
and indigenous security forces directly and indirectly counter terrorist groups, mitigating 
the need for occupying forces to actively provide security for the area.  At the root of the 
strategy is securing the support of the population; without popular support, neither the 
terrorist nor the counter-terrorist can be successful.  As discussed in the SOI case study, 
this indirect approach to countering terrorist safe havens can take on two different forms: 
defensive and offensive.  The defensive approach is one where U.S. forces are working in 
concert with indigenous security forces to not only counter threats to the government, but 
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also improve upon the underlying grievances that may have caused the insurgency.323  
The offensive form of this approach, according to political scientist Thomas Henriksen, 
“is far easier to execute than its defensive counterpart. It usually translates into a more 
limited and briefer military, political, and economic presence by U.S. armed forces.”324  
The offensive form was witnessed during the 1980’s when the U.S. supported the 
mujahedeen against the Soviet Union, the contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and again in 2001 when a limited number of U.S. Special Forces supported the Northern 
Alliance in destroying the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda’s safe haven.325 
The SOI strategy was a defensive approach that was remarkably successful but 
uneven; certain areas took longer to secure than others. The most critical factor in the 
success of the SOI was undoubtedly tribal buy-in; had there been an absence of tribal 
support, the strategy would have been doomed for failure and potentially created more 
problems for both the fledgling Iraqi government and U.S. forces.  Much like the case of 
the Shining Path, AQI’s brutality towards the population of Al Anbar served as the 
catalyst that led to the demise of the terrorist group’s safe haven. This loss of popular 
support provided an opening for U.S. forces to exploit. 
The strategy of employing surrogate security forces proved effective in the near 
term at denying AQI a sanctuary, but the prospects of long-term success require steadfast 
commitment from a foreign power, the local government, or both. Since the U.S 
withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, terrorist attacks have seen a resurgence that has not been 
witnessed since the height of AQI in 2007.326 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR USSOF 
When developing a strategy to counter terrorist safe havens there is no one “silver 
bullet” for the problem.  The individual strategies analyzed in this thesis all provide 
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potential options for USSOF to counter the complex problem of safe havens.  However, 
based on the analysis of this thesis, the best strategy should be a combination and/or 
sequencing of the approaches analyzed in this study. 
Specifically, our analysis found that in each case, the strengths of the insurgencies 
and the foundation for a successful safe haven was rooted in popular support.  In Iraq and 
Peru, both AQI and Shining Path insurgents proved to be the most instrumental variable 
in their demise rather than the government’s efforts.  The loss of support from the 
population became the catalyst that enabled the successful decapitation strategy in Peru 
and the tribal uprising in Iraq.  In Rhodesia the Selous Scouts were extremely successful 
in their ability to destroy the ZANLA and ZIPRA networks from within, but the strategy 
never addressed the grievances of African tribal population.  Coupled with sanctions and 
a lack of international legitimacy, the Rhodesian government never had a chance of 
winning the peace in Rhodesia, no matter how many terrorists they killed.  Likewise, the 
French containment of the Casbah proved tactically successful, but a lack of support from 
the people of France, as well as from Algerians, ultimately gave Algeria and the FLN a 
strategic victory. 
These cases demonstrate that the importance of winning the population is the 
critical variable for long-term success in countering terrorist safe havens.  However, 
given the debatable success of U.S. led efforts at nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the prospects for long-term involvement of U.S. forces to address aggrieved societies and 
rebuild governance are unlikely.  The most successful case with regard to engaging and 
winning the population is the Peruvian government’s denial of safe havens and their 
decapitation strategy. Ultimately, the government won the support of the population and 
used them to gain actionable intelligence. However, the Peruvians had to facilitate a 
national reconciliation and address grievances to achieve this success; they did this alone, 
not with the help of a foreign power. 
Terrorist safe havens currently exist in both Iraq and Afghanistan, even though 
billions of dollars have been spent and hundreds of thousands of troops deployed to both 
countries.  The strategy of nation building for the United States is currently not 
financially or politically feasible to combat safe havens.  Therefore the strategies  
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presented here seek limited intervention, lower cost, tactical and operational options to 
address sanctuaries with a recommendation that host-nation governments, rather than the 
United States, respond to grievances. 
All of the strategies analyzed in this thesis are currently viable for USSOF with 
the exception of pseudo operations.  A pseudo operations strategy, as witnessed in 
Rhodesia, is perhaps the best strategy to combat demographic safe havens in both 
ungoverned and fully governed areas. However, this option is currently not viable to 
USSOF for a few reasons.  First, USSOF is not structurally organized to support a pseudo 
operations capability because the current force structure is designed to employ teams, 
troops, and platoons to execute special operations, rather than small teams of one or two 
pseudo operators.  Second, USSOF operators do not currently have a sufficient level of 
specialized training to conduct pseudo operations.  In order to develop this skill set, 
USSOF would need the support of both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 
Central Intelligence Agency to develop, standardize, and implement a pseudo operator 
training course. 
A containment strategy was useful to the French, who already had the material 
resources in Algeria and the political will to literally contain a limited geographic area.  
However, containment of a specific area solely by U.S. forces is not politically feasible 
today because it would undoubtedly be viewed as imperialistic and counter to American 
values and foreign policy. However, a containment strategy could be implemented with 
host nation forces, whose government had the political will, appropriate amount of 
troops, and material to contain the problem area.  Host nation forces conducting a 
containment strategy would help mitigate the political risk of having American forces 
occupying a geographic area for both the U.S. and the host nation. 
In Iraq, the SOI have been all but forgotten by the central government, and AQI 
enjoys a safe haven in Al Anbar province again today, where the United Nations 
estimates that 7,000 people have been killed in terrorist attacks in Iraq thus far in 
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2013.327  During a meeting on November 1, 2013, “President Obama and embattled Iraqi 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki agreed . . .  to coordinate on reviving the ‘Sons of Iraq’ 
Sunni militias to counter a growing Al Qaeda insurgency as part of an overall effort to 
bolster the Shiite-led Baghdad government.”328  Given that the fledgling Iraqi 
government is seeking U.S. assistance now, after advocating a withdrawal of U.S. forces 
in 2011, indicates that the situation in Iraq has severely deteriorated.  A reinvigoration of 
the SOI strategy in Iraq could provide the Iraqi government the space needed to mount 
effective counterterrorism operations.  However, the Iraqi’s will have to manage the 
strategy with limited U.S. assistance, as the likelihood of a return of U.S. troops to Iraq is 
extremely limited. 
A decapitation strategy also is potentially useful for USSOF, but has limited 
results by itself.  The case study of Peru shows that, although the government destroyed 
the Shining Path, there are still remnants of the terror group seeking to reassert itself 
today.  The U.S. Government and military have made decapitation of insurgent and 
terrorist groups one of its main strategies in the fight against Al Qaeda, especially 
through its drone campaign and direct action raids. However, a decapitation strategy 
alone has limited strategic utility, as host nation authorities must address the grievances 
of the population to prevent the growth of the insurgency, as the population is the center 
of gravity. 
Overall, the case studies demonstrate that each strategy offers tactical success in 
the short term but lacks long term sustainment.  To have enduring success countering 
terrorist safe havens, the host nation must be willing to address underlying causes or 
grievances that instigated the insurgent movement and led the population to provide 
sanctuary.  USSOF cannot fill this void alone. However, through a combination and 
sequencing of the strategies analyzed in this thesis, USSOF can assist host nation forces 
in degrading terrorist safe havens and providing space to facilitate their efforts to address 
long-term reforms to win the population. 
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In conclusion, perhaps the most viable strategy USSOF could pursue would be a 
combination of all the strategies in this thesis, with proper sequencing, and with each 
approach mutually supporting each other.  Demographic safe havens arguably present the 
greatest obstacle to the current force structure of USSOF, because USSOF currently does 
not have a pseudo operations capability that could be implemented against terrorist safe 
havens.  U.S. Army Special Forces in particular could find a true niche in conducting 
these operations; however, this would require targeted recruiting and training to 
effectively implement this strategy.  USSF have been consistently engaged in the current 
war on terror, and the unique skill sets that USSF soldiers wield make them an excellent 
choice for spearheading pseudo operations.  Coupled with interagency support, the 
United States could leverage the intelligence expertise, cultural knowledge, language 
capability, and tactical prowess of USSF to conduct pseudo operations. 
Currently the focus of USSF has been Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and counter 
terrorism (CT); these missions are important, but typically focused on near term goals 
and tactical objectives. The employment of pseudo teams could develop deep penetration 
of terrorist safe havens and networks around the world and maximize the strategic utility 
of the force.  Furthermore, pseudo operations could be used to infiltrate and target narco-
terrorist groups that are closely tied with violent extremist groups. 
Furthermore, the FID mission conducted by USSF is geared towards indigenous 
security and military forces that USSF could leverage for implementation of a 
decapitation strategy.  USSF pseudo teams could infiltrate terrorist networks and their 
safe havens and gather actionable intelligence upon which the host nation security forces, 
or surrogates in under-governed or ungoverned countries, could act.  This is an example 
of sequencing these different strategies to counter geographic and demographic safe 
havens and undermine terrorist and insurgent groups. 
Overall, these strategies limit the overt U.S. presence in the area, and put the onus 
on the host nation’s forces, or surrogate forces, to conduct kinetic operations.  US 
strategic goals are achieved by denying terrorist safe havens at a fraction of the cost 
compared to large-scale intervention and nation building.  In order to successfully 
achieve these strategies, the development and employment of USSF-led pseudo teams 
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would have to be carefully selected to ensure the proper training, manning, and 
authorities for the missions that the teams would conduct. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of employing USSF pseudo teams is one of 
persistent engagement in the region.  USSF need to be consistently embedded with host 
nation security forces as advisors and trainers, much like the current JCET training 
exchanges today, but on a more consistent and permanent basis.  This persistent 
engagement would allow pseudo operatives access to denied areas where terrorist safe 
havens flourish for recruitment and intelligence collection.  This engagement would also 
develop and nurture relationships with host nation strike forces that could be called upon 
to action targets similar to the Rhodesian model. 
This approach is not novel. James Spies, for example, advocates a similar model 
where SOF pseudo teams and “turned terrorists” fix the enemy and regional USSOCOM 
CT forces finish the target.329  Although this construct could prove valuable, host nation 
CT forces should be employed as much as possible to finish the targets, rather than 
unilateral USSOCOM CT forces.  In some critical situations, the host nation will not have 
the capability; in others, an absence of trust may warrant U.S. unilateral action.  Overall, 
this approach, combined with USSF and partner-nation collaboration, would be a 
potential solution to countering terrorist networks and their safe havens. 
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